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I.

INTRODUCTION

Nations historically have employed economic coercion' in the
conduct of their foreign affairs with varying degrees of success.
1. Throughout this Article, "international economic coercion" means a
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Despite the technological and political intricacies that earmark
the current international economic system, 2 the transnational
boycott remains a prominent technique of international economic
coercion.
The transnational boycott can be described as a coercive quasiconspiratorial combination effort by one state to prevent another
state from transacting commercial business. 3 Threats or intimidation may be directed at the target state's customers to induce
them to withhold or withdraw their patronage.4 While the ends

state's controlled management of access to goods, services, money, or markets,
for the purpose of denying access to a target state while maintaining access for
itself. See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELIcIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 30 (1961). For a discussion of different kinds of economic coercion, see K.
KNORR, THE POWER OF NATONS 79-103 (1975). See also ECONOMIC COERCION AND
THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (R. Lillich ed. 1976); Acevedo, The
U.S. Measures against Argentina resultingfrom the Malvinas Conflict, 78 Am.
J. INT'L L. 323 (1984); Bilder, Comments on the Legality of the Arab Oil Boycott, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 41 (1977); Blum, Economic Boycotts in International
Law, 12 TEx. INT'L L.J. 5 (1977); Bowett, InternationalLaw and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 245 (1976); Dempsey, Economic Aggression and SelfDefense in InternationalLaw: The Arab Oil Weapon and Alternative American Responses Thereto, 9 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 253 (1977); Doxey, International Sanctions in Theory and Practice, 15 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 273
(1983); Lillich, The Status of Economic Coercion Under International Law:
United Nations Norms, 12 TEx. INT'L L. J. 17 (1977); Lillich, Economic Coercion and the InternationalLegal Order, 51 INT'L AFF. 358 (1975); Lillich, Economic Coercion and the "New InternationalEconomic Order".A Second Look
at Some FirstImpressions, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 233 (1976); Neff, The Law of Economic Coercion: Lessons from the Past and Indications of the Future, 20
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 411 (1981).
2. See generally D. BLAKE & R. WALTERS, Tm POLITICS OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1983); J. SPERO, TmE PoLrrIcs OF INTERNATIONAL EcoNOmiC RELATIONS (2d ed. 1981).
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 234 (4th ed. 1968). Two other specific techniques of economic coercion have been used in recent years. First, an economic
blockade is used to terminate all of a state's commerce. Second, a trade embargo
is used by one state to prohibit the departure of ships or goods from the ports of
another state until further orders are given. For perceptive treatments, see A.
HINDMARSH, FORCE IN PEACE 64-71 (1933); W. MEDLICOTT, THE ECONOMIC
BLOCKADE (1959). Cf. Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon: A Reply and
Reaffirmation of Illegality, 15 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 57 (1976); Paust &

Blaustein, The Arab Oil Weapon-A Threat to InternationalPeace, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 410 (1974); Shihata, Arab Oil Policies and the New InternationalEconomic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 261 (1976); Shihata, Destination Embargo of
Arab Oil: Its Legality Under InternationalLaw, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 591 (1974).
4. See supra note 3. See generally Bouv6, The National Boycott as an In-
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and means of transnational boycotts may seem clear, their legal
status appears to be open to conjecture. This situation can be attributed in no small part to the more sophisticated and manipulative methods currently available for effecting and maintaining

modern boycotts.5
This Article first seeks to examine critically the historical
evolution and policy underpinnings of the transnational boycott
and the political and economic ramifications that stem from a
state's use of a boycott strategy. Second, this Article attempts to
determine more precisely the international legal status of the
transnational boycott as a deliberate instrument of a state's foreign policy. The intent of this analysis is to provide a better understanding of the political rationales of governments that resort
to boycott strategies, the resultant economic implications, and the
international legal parameters for transnational boycotts.

II.

THE TRANSNATIONAL BoycoTT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A.

General Observations

Concerted efforts to deny social and economic intercourse to
designated individuals or groups have occurred since Biblical
times. For example, the Jews eschewed the Samaritans; the Pharisees ostracized the Publicans; and the Greeks, after the rule of
Cleisthenes, often shunned unsuccessful aspirants for high politi-

ternationalDelinquency, 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 19 (1934).
5. The traditional declaratory forms of economic coercion, boycotts, blockades, and embargoes, no longer suffice to influence one's adversaries or, for that
matter, one's allies. More refined measures of coercion have greatly amplified
the scope and nature of contemporary international economic coercion, particularly when used to augment a state's boycott strategy. These measures have included the blocking or freezing of a target state's foreign assets; the blacklisting
of firms and individuals trading with the target state; preclusive transnational
purchasing designed to evaporate potential foreign supplies for the target state;
controlling the transshipment of products from a neutral state's territory; the
imposition of licensing schemes, tariffs, or quotas for regulating selected imports
or exports; the enactment of measures aimed at manipulating the strength of a
target state's foreign exchange; the curtailment of foreign aid or development
assistance; and, over the long term, penetrating the target state's economy by
the use of cartels, the discouragement of technological transfers, or the restriction of available patent assignments. M. MCDOUGAL & F. FELICINO, supra note
1, at 30. An analysis of these economically coercive policies is found in Y. Wu,
ECONOMIC WARFARE passim (1952).
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cal office." Throughout the ascendancy of the Roman Empire,
many citizens were publicly rendered social outcasts under the
recognized fiat of interdictio aqua et igni ("the denial of water
and fire to a legal transgressor"). During the Middle Ages, the
Roman Catholic Church's sanction of excommunication was tantamount to an "imperial ban," which "severed a person from the
Christian community" and relegated him to the merciless status
of a pagan." The antitrade measures undertaken by North American colonists during the late 1760s and early 1770s against local
English merchants are also noteworthy examples of economic disapproval and protest.9 While all of these actions certainly shared
the objective of deliberate alienation with boycotts, they were
designated by contemporary political literature as "acts of economic non-intercourse," not "boycotts" in the strict sense.10
The word "boycott" did not appear in the vernacular until the
late nineteenth century. The term can be traced to the organized
social ostracism in 1880 of Captain Charles C. Boycott, an English
rent collector for the Earl of Erne's estates in County Mayo, Ireland, by local tenant farmers.1 ' From its inception during this
6. H.

LAIDLER,

BOYCOTTS

AND THE LABOR

STRUGGLE: ECONOMIC

AND LEGAL

ASPECTS 27 (1913).

7. In imperial times this Roman form of punishment included deportation to
an island and forfeiture of all property rights, but allowed retention of citizenship. 1 H. ROBY, ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 45-46 (1902).
8. F. LOGAN, EXCOMMUNICATION AND THE SECULAR ARMY IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND: A STUDY IN LEGAL PROCEDURE FOR THE THIRTEENTH TO THE SIXTEENTH

13 (1968).
9. For an historical discussion of North American colonial boycotts against

CENTURY

English goods, see H.
1960).
10. See, 2 L.

FAULKNER, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY

OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW

166 (8th ed.

134-35 (7th ed. 1952); E.

VATTEL, LAW OF NATIONS 145 (6th ed. 1844); cf. 6

G.

DE

HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF

152 (1943).
11. Beginning in 1878, Ireland was beset by a severe agricultural crisis. English landlords saw the famine conditions as an excellent opportunity to drive
out unwanted tenant farmers from their estates. To remedy this unjust situation, Charles S. Parnell assumed leadership of the farmers' cause and banded
together the Irish Land League, a union which served as the farmers' representative bargaining agency with the estate owners.
In August 1880 Captain Boycott refused to accept as full payment a group of
rent collections that had been reduced 25%by the Land League. The consequences of Boycott's recalcitrance were soon evident: his life was threatened,
portions of his property were destroyed, several workers were forced by the
Land League to leave his employ, and tenant farmers on his estate refused to
INTERNATIONAL LAW
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particular episode in Irish history, the appellation "boycott" has
come to denote any intentional social or political policy of economic excommunication.

B. The Chinese Boycotts: 1905-1933
For twenty-five years after Captain Boycott's ostracism, boy-

cotting incidents were limited to domestic labor movements, with
those in the United States attaining the most prominence. 12 In
1905, however, the first transnational application of a boycott was
instigated by China against the United States. This boycott began
the period during the early twentieth century when China was
considered the undisputed master practitioner of the national
boycott. From 1905 to 1931, China effectively organized and rigorously enforced at least eleven national boycotts on nine separate
occasions. 13
work for, or even associate with, any member of the Boycott family. Deprived of
local labor for gathering the potato harvest, Captain Boycott was compelled
within a month to entreat the English landlords for assistance. They agreed to
secure a relief expedition, and hired 50 men from Ulster to work under the
guard of 900 English soldiers to bring in Boycott's crop. Although the landlord's
actions saved Boycott's crops and circumvented the local labor strike, the price
they paid remains an example of poetic justice: the estate owners' protective
scheme for digging up an estimated £500 of Captain Boycott's potatoes cost the
British Government more than £5,000. Vinton, The History of "Boycotting," 5
MAG. W. HIST. 211-24 (1886).
12. See generally, H. LAIDLER, supra note 6; L. WOLMAN, THE BoYcoTT IN
AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS (1916).
13. C. REmER, A STUDY OF CHINESE BoYcoTrs wiTH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO

THEIR ECONOIc EFFECTIVENESS 22 (1933). In 1905 China imposed a six-month
boycott against the United States because of the latter's restrictive immigration
entry policies for Chinese laborers. Id. at 29. In 1908 a nine-month boycott was
imposed against Japan in reaction to an ultimatum the Japanese Government
had issued to the Chinese Government following China's controversial seizure of
the Japanese steamer Tatsu Maru. Id. at 40; North China Herald, Apr. 24, 1908,
at 218; Orchard, China's Use of the Boycott as a Political Weapon, 152 ANNALS
253, 253 (1930). In January 1915 another Chinese boycott was directed against
Japan in response to the infamous "Twenty-One Demands" that Japan had dictated earlier that month to the Chinese Government. The Twenty-One Demands
were a set of political concessions demanded by Japan to extract territorial prerogatives, special railway permits, and various mining privileges in specified regions of Manchuria, Eastern Mongolia, Shantung, the Yangtze Valley, and Fukien. C. REMER, supra, at 46. While this boycott lasted only six months,

Japanese exports to China during the interim are estimated to have fallen by
some $18 million. Orchard, supra, at 254. In May 1919 a popular boycott campaign lasting two years was launched by China against Japan to protest the lat-
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Thus, by the 1930s China had deservedly acquired an internater's acquisition under the Versailles Treaty of property rights in Shantung that
had previously been held by Germany. Accounts of the 1919 Shantung boycott
are found in Muller, The New East, 109 THE NATION 833 (1919); Sokolsky, 99
THE INDEPENDENT 388, 388-90 (1919); LITERARY DIG., July 19, 1919, at 19. When
extrapolated over the boycott's prolonged two-year operation, Japan suffered a
combined trade loss with China of nearly $116 million. Orchard, supra, at 255.
In 1923 a fourth boycott was undertaken against the Japanese over the latter's
repeated failure to abrogate the Twenty-One Demands of 1915. C. REMER,
supra,at 80. Japan's exports to China during the seven months of the 1923 boycott decreased by approximately $34.5 million, or about four percent of Japan's
entire export trade in 1922. Orchard, supra, at 256. Sparked by labor disputes in
foreign-managed worker settlements during 1925 and 1926, a "triple boycott"
was organized simultaneously against Japanese, British, and Hong Kong commercial interests in China. C. REMER, supra, at 92. When compared to the average annual value of trade conducted between 1921 and 1924, the fifteen-month
boycott cost British export trade $58 million, Orchard, supra, at 260, while
Hong Kong's external trade fell by some $3 million. Id. at 259. In March 1927
the arrival in China of some 16,000 British troops and a smaller contingent of
Japanese Marines, touched off popular boycotts over the next year against trade
from both countries. See C. REmER, supra, at 128-30. The value of Japanese
trade lost by China's 1927 boycotts exceeded $2.735 million. Orchard, supra, at
256. After armed clashes between the Chinese Nationalist Army and Japanese
troops in May 1928, a general boycott against all Japanese goods in China was
enforced in 1928 and 1929. C. REMER, supra, at 137, 140. More than $36.5 million in exports to China were lost by Japan during 1928-1929. Orchard, supra, at
256. Last, the invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931 elicited the Great Boycott of 1931-1933-the most intense, prolonged, and effective transnational boycott up to that time. C. REMER, supra, at 163. Of the early experiments in transnational economic coercion, the Great Boycott of 1931-1933 stands out for its
sophisticated organization and strict enforcement procedures.
In 1931 the Shanghai Municipal Anti-Japanese and Chinese Emigration Association was created to implement a comprehensive boycott program. General coordination responsibilities were assumed by the Nationalists' Kuomintang. The
scope of these boycotting techniques was well illustrated in the October 1931
resolutions adopted by the Shanghai Anti-Japanese Association: (1) all Chinese
merchants were to abstain from the purchase, sale, transportation, or consumption of Japanese goods unless permission was given by the Anti-Japanese Association; (2) Chinese merchants were to remove all Japanese goods to Association
warehouses within a week; (3) Chinese merchants were to abstain from supplying raw materials to the Japanese; (4) pickets were to be posted to prevent the
loading or unloading of Japanese cargo and to prohibit Chinese passengers from
travelling on Japanese ships; (5) wharf coolies were to refuse to handle Japanese
cargo; (6) Chinese were to withdraw all deposits from Japanese banks and cease
to use Japanese bank notes; (7) Chinese banks were to cease dealing with
Japanese firms or with Chinese firms guilty of breaking the boycott; (8) all Chinese were to resign from Japanese employ within a period of three days; and (9)
all Chinese firms were to discharge their Japanese employees within a period of
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tional reputation as the national boycotter par excellence.
China's continuing experiment with transnational boycotts, however, was more significant for establishing the credibility of, and
demonstrating effective methods for utilizing, economic coercion
as an instrument of political protest against the policies of other
states.
C.

Collateral National Boycotts: 1896-1955
1.

India's Boycotts of Great Britain

Among the innovators of transnational boycotts were leaders of
the swadeshi movement, a nationalistic organization that flourished between 1880 and 1906 throughout northern colonial In-

dia. 14 The first swadeshi-inspiredboycott arose in February 1896,
as a direct result of Great Britain's imposition of an unpopular

series of countervailing duties on Indian cloth. 15 The partition of
Bengal in July 1905 unleashed the second swadeshi boycott, a
movement symbolically directed against textile imports from

three days. North China Herald, Oct. 6, 1931, at 12. The strategy underpinning
China's boycott, therefore, was the complete severance of economic relations
with Japan. To attain this goal, additional boycott measures were devised, including: (1) the cancellation of existing orders for Japanese goods; (2) the refusal
to accept Japanese goods in transit at the time of the boycott's inception upon
arrival at their points of destination; (3) the registration of all available in-store
Japanese products, which were then either placed under confiscatory seal or sold
at public auction (if sold at auction, the proceeds were donated to a municipal
boycott association); (4) the denial of foodstuffs and other supplies to all resident Japanese; (5) the refusal of the use of any port facilities to ships of Japanese registry; and (6) the obstruction of public communication, whether by radio, telephone, or telegraph, with all Japanese citizens. C. REMER, supra, at 172.
The effectiveness of these methods of economic coercion obviously depended
upon how rigorously they were enforced. In the early days of the 1931 boycott,
various local penalties were fixed for smuggling Japanese goods into China. For
instance, in Shanghai three degrees of public punishment were carried out in
1931: (1) if the value of the goods exceeded Ch. $5,000, the face of the offender
was branded with the three Chinese characters signifying traitor; (2) for goods
valued between Ch. $2,500 and Ch. $5,000, the offender was arrested and placed
in a wooden cage for a week; (3) for goods valued below Ch. $1,000, the offending
merchant was paraded through the street for three successive days. North China
Herald, July 28, 1931, at 11.
14. B. CHANDRA, THE RISE AND GROWTH oF ECONoMc NATIONALISM IN INDIA
122 (1966).
15. Id. at 130.

TRANSNATIONAL BOYCOTTS
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Great Britain. 6 The last and largest of India's transnational boycotts came in April 1930. This boycott, organized by Mahatma
Gandhi, was conceived as an act of civil disobedience designed to
encourage pan-Indian protest against Great Britain's increase on
17
the tax of India's indigenous manufacture of salt.

2.

The Turkish Boycott of Austria-Hungary

On October 6, 1908, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy proclaimed its annexation of Bosnia and Herzogovina, and permitted
Bulgaria to declare its independence from the Ottoman Empire.18
Two days later, Austria refused to honor any settlement of Turkey's claims to Bulgarian debts. Reacting to this refusal, militant
young Turks in Constantinople instigated a national boycott on
all Austro-Hungarian goods and shipping facilities.19 Their effort
was formalized on October 21 with the creation of the "Ottoman
Boycott Committee," which was charged with systematically directing Turkey's boycott operation. 20 Although peaceful settlement of the dispute came within six months, Turkey's boycott
was considered effective in that Austria reported a substantial
loss of trade revenues during that period.21
16. The boycott, which was supported by Indian mill owners, was principally
intended to dispel illusions of British economic omnipotence. N. BOSE, THE INDIAN NATiONAL MOVEMENT 46 (1974).
17. R. MOORE, THE CRISIS OF INDIAN UNITY 1917-1940 171 (1974). The boycott's chief trade targets included imports of British cloth, liquors, and intoxicating drugs. Id. The mass arrest of its leaders, repressive local ordinances, and
an agricultural depression contributed to the 1930 boycott's brief duration and
swift demise. N. BOSE, supra note 16, at 93.
18. T. BATZ, INTERNATIONAL LAW 66-70 (1909). See generally, B. SCHMITT,
THE ANNEXATION oF BOSNIA, 1908-1909 (1937).
19. The boycott was aimed chiefly at Austrian goods. The inclusion of Hungary as a target state was intended mainly to incite Hungarian public opinion
against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzogovina. W. DAviD, EUROPEAN DPLOMACY IN THE NEAR EASTERN QUESTION 1906-1909, at 101 n.81 (1940), reprinted in
25 ILL. STUD. Soc. ScI. No. 4, at 101 n.81 (1975).
20. W. DAVm, supra note 19, at 101 n.81, reprinted at 101 n.81.
21. Austria's exports to Turkey declined from £920,000 (Turkish pounds) in
the last quarter of 1907 to £417,000 (Turkish pounds) in the last quarter of
1908. W. DAVID, supra note 19, at 102 n.86, reprinted at 102 n.86. One estimate
placed Austria's total trade loss at 20,000,000 francs. See W. DAVIn, supra note
19, at 102 n.86, reprinted at 102 n.86.
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The COMECON Boycott of Yugoslavia

The widening ideological rift between Marshall Tito's government and the Soviet Union after World War II culminated in the
expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Soviet bloc in 1948. In addition
to political ostracism, the Soviet Union and its Eastern European
satellite countries implemented a complete economic boycott of
Yugoslavia, 22 employing a variety of anti-Yugoslav measures
through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON).23 The COMECON boycott of Yugoslavia ended in
1955 when political rapprochement facilitated the normalization
of economic relations. Nevertheless, the seven-year boycott almost completely reversed Yugoslavia's international trade
pattern.24
4. Great Britain'sBoycott of Iran
On May 1, 1951, Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh proclaimed the nationalization of Iran's oil industry, including the
indigenous British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company.25 Fol22.

M. DOXEY, EcoNoMIC SANCTIONS AND REGIONAL ENFORCEMENT 33-34

(1971). See generally R. FARRELL, YUGOSLAVIA AND THE SovIET UNION 1948-1956
(1956).
23. In 1948 Hungary, without justification, terminated war reparation payments due Yugoslavia, Bulgaria ceased restitution of cultural objects taken from
Yugoslavia during World War H, the Soviet Union and COMECON members
abruptly cancelled several validly concluded commercial contracts with Yugoslavia, and all economic agreements with Yugoslavia were voided. One authoritative Yugoslav document posited that by 1951, the Soviet Union had unilaterally
abrogated no less than 46 treaties relating to political, economic, and cultural
dealings with the Yugoslav Government. For an analysis, supplemented by official documentation, of these and other measures utilized in the Yugoslav boycott, see generally YUGOSLAV MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHITE BOOK ON AGTOWARDS
GRESSIVE ACTIVTIES BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF Tm USSR ...
YUGOSLAVIA (1951).
24. In 1947 an estimated 56% of Yugoslavia's imports came from Soviet bloc
countries. By 1948 this figure had dropped to 45.7%. In 1955, however, only
3.6% of products imported by Yugoslavia came from COMECON members. Exports evidenced a similar trend. In 1948 nearly 51% (down 2% from the previous year) of Yugoslavia's exports were sent to COMECON countries. When the
boycott was terminated in 1955, Yugoslav exports to Soviet bloc states had diminished to a mere 10% of its export trade. Soviet-Yugoslav Economic Relations 1945-1955, 12 WORLD TODAY 38, 42 (1956) (table).
25. The British Government, greatly offended by the abruptness of Mossadegh's action, charged that his nationalization of Iran's oil industry directly
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lowing futile diplomatic efforts,26 the British Government in June
1951 chose to foment internal unrest against the Mossadegh regime by imposing an all-inclusive boycott against imported Iranian commodities, 27 freezing Iranian deposits in British banks,28
and undertaking concerted measures to preclude Iran's participation in the free trade of the world petroleum market.2 9
The British boycott of Iranian trade effectively ended with the
overthrow of Mossadegh's regime on August 19, 1953, and the accession to power of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. This twenty-six
month involuntary estrangement from world commerce was costly
for the Iranian economy. The loss in petro-revenues, the alienation of former trading customers, and the interruption of poten-

tially forthcoming developmental assistance were particularly
damaging.3 0

contravened the 1933 Concession Agreement by which Iran had deprived itself
of "the sovereign right of annulling the contract at any time." N. FATEMI, Om
DIPLOMACY 181 (1954). N.Y. Times, May 26, 1951, at 1, col. 7.
26. In addition to diplomacy, the British made a show of force, ordering
troops and naval vessels to the Mediterranean. N.Y. Times, May 26, 1951, at 1,
col. 7.
27. See N.Y. Times, July 1, 1951, at 1, col. 5.
28. B. NmuMAND, IRAN: THE NEW IMPERIALISM IN AcTION 55 (1969). In addition, the British Exchequer directed that any purchaser of Iranian oil making
payment in pounds sterling would be subject to criminal sanctions. Id.
29. The undertaking entailed a two-part plan. First, to offset any possible
harmful effects on world petroleum prices that might arise from removing Iranian oil from world commerce, a "voluntary" agreement was drawn up among
the seven major international oil companies. Instigated by Great Britain and
jointly promulgated on June 25, 1951, under the auspices of the United States
Departments of Defense and Interior, this compact required the seven major
cartel members (Gulf Oil, Socony-Mobil Oil, Standard Oil of California, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Texaco, British Petroleum, and Royal Dutch Shell) to
adopt certain stipulations to regulate the sale and exchange of oil and to absorb
localized production increases in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. These production increases, as anticipated, fully compensated market demand in light of the
withdrawal of Iranian oil. Id. at 68-69.
As the second facet of Great Britain's boycott scheme, the international oil
cartel affirmed that any shipping company which provided tankers for transporting Iranian oil would receive no further shipping orders from the cartel's
affiliated subsidiaries. This threat was not dismissed lightly by the international
shipping industry; fewer than 40 tankers were willing to risk transporting Iranian crude oil during the two years in which the Mossadegh Government remained in power. Id. at 70.
30. Perhaps the best indicator of the effectiveness of Britain's boycott is that
Iran managed to export only 103,000 tons of petroleum during the two-year boy-
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D. The Arab Boycott Against Israel
Of all the contemporary boycotts, the League of Arab States'3 '
boycott against Israel is, ideologically, the most virulent; organizationally, the most sophisticated; politically, the most protracted; and, legally, the most polemic.3 2 The anti-Israel boycott
by Arab states to
originated and persists as a political response
34
Israel's formation 33 and continued existence.

cott period-an aggregate sum less than the amount of petroleum it had exported each day prior to nationalization. Id. at 55.
31. The Arab League formally came into existence on March 22, 1945, with
the following states as charter members: Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen. Currently, there are 21 Arab League states, including the
seven listed above and Libya (1953), The Sudan (1956), Tunisia (1958), Morocco
(1958), Kuwait (1961), Algeria (1962), People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
(1967), Bahrain (1971), United Arab Emirates (1971), Oman (1971), Qatar
(1971), Mauritania (1973), Somali Republic (1974), and Djibouti (1978). On
March 31, 1979, in reaction to the peace treaty signed with Israel, the Arab
League voted to expel Egypt and extend the scope of the anti-Israel boycott to
trade with Egypt. See Howe, Arab League Expels Egypt, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1,
1979, at 1, col. 3; see also Saudis Reported to Favor Recalling Envoys in Cairo
but Retaining Ties, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1979, at 2, col. 1; Saudis and U.S. Act
to Keep Close Ties, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1979, at 7, col. 1.
32. For further commentary on these observations, see generally C. Joyner,
Boycott in International Law: A Case Study of the Arab States and Israel (May
13, 1977) (unpublished dissertation available in University of Virginia Library).
33. The origins of the Arab boycott actually antedate Israel's creation in
1948. On December 2, 1945, the Council of the Arab League adopted Resolution
No. 16, which formally initiated the boycott. The resolution advocated that:
Jewish products and manufactured [goods] in Palestine shall be [considered] undesirable in the Arab countries; to permit them to enter the Arab
countries would lead to the realization of the Zionist political objectives.
Accordingly, until these objectives are changed, .

.

. every State of the

League should, before January 1, 1946, take measures which they consider
fit and which will be in conformity with the principles of administration
and legislation therein, such as making use of import balances in this respect in order to prevent these products and manufactured [goods] from
entering [these] countries regardless of whether they have come from Palestine or by any other route.
Resolution No. 16, The Council of the League of Arab States, Sess. 2, Sched. 11
(Dec. 2, 1945), at 6, reprinted in M. KHALIL, THE ARAB STATES AND THE ARAB
LEAGUE: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 161 (1962).
In June 1946 the Arab League Council implemented the boycott program
through Resolution No. 70, calling for several economically coercive actions.
These included the establishment of local boycott offices in each participating
member state; a ban on raw material exports which aided "Zionist production";
the listing of materials and commodities exported from Arab countries to aid
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Structurally, the Arab boycott of Israel manifests itself at four
target levels. First, there is a primary boycott, by which Arab
League states refuse to purchase Israeli products. Second, Western firms that are suspected of violating boycott regulations 35 become the target of a secondary boycott which "blacklists"3 6 them
from trade with Arab League members. Third, there is the complicated tertiary boycott in which Arab governments pressure pri-

Palestinian Arabs; use of certification procedures by customs officials as a means
of ascertaining the national origin of imported goods; and a boycott of "Zionist
services" in Palestine, including banks, insurance companies, factories, commercial houses, transportation agencies, and work contractors. Resolution No. 70,
The Council of the League of Arab States, Sess. 4, Sched. 6, at 18-19, reprinted
in M. KHALIL,supra, at 162-63. See also Burgoyne, Arab League Boycott Regulations: Their Origin and Growth Examined, 1977 AmTI-BoycoTr BULL. 87.
34. See Boutros-Ghali, The Arab League: Ten Years of Struggle, 498 INT'L
CONCILIATION 387-406 (1954); Losman, The Arab Boycott of Israel, 3 INT'L J.
MIDDLE E. STUD. 99 (1972).
Significantly, some commentators have contended that the belligerent conditions that have existed legally between Israel and its Arab neighbors since 1948
further substantiate the legality of this boycott operation. Although armistice
agreements were signed in 1949 between Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, with the exception of the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt, peace
treaties have never been formally negotiated. Thus, because an armistice agreement "does not signify termination of the state of war between belligerent parties," the Arab boycott represents the continuation of a war by economic means.
M. ISKANDAR, THE ARAB BoYcoTT OF ISRAEL 15-21 (1966); see also S. ROSENNI,
ISRAEL'S ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS WITH THE ARAB STATES--A JURIDICAL INTERPRE-

22-45 (1951); Dep't of State, Memorandum Concerning Boycott Provisions in U.S. Law and the Arab Boycott of Israel, DiscriminatoryArab Pressure
on U.S. Business: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Int'l Trade and Commerce
of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 223, 223-25 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Dep't of State Memorandum].
35. Dep't of State Memorandum, supra note 34, at 223-25. But see Hamza,
Update on Arab States' Policies on Boycott Rules and Accommodation, 2 Boycorr L. BULL. 165 (1966); Ludwig & Smith, The Business Effects of the Antiboycott Provisions of the Export Administration Amendments of 1977-Morality Plus Pragmatism Equals Complexity, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CONOP. L. 581
(1978); Saba, How to Deal with Being Blacklisted: A Word About Negotiating
TATION

Contracts, 1977 ANTI-BoYcorr BULL. 125.

36. "Blacklisting," in this instance, is the prohibition of any dealings with a
person or firm from Israel. Blacklisting is imposed by individual Arab governments primarily to deny entry of the blacklisted subject's goods or services into
those states. See H. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DIsPuTEs 270-71 (1975); Burgoyne, supra note 32, at 88; Vander Clute, How the
Blacklist Works, Its Criteriafor Listing and the Procedures Used, 1977 ANTIBoycoTT BULL. 45.
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vate firms to reject trade with firms that continue to trade with

Israel. 37 Last, there is an anomalous, albeit intriguing target level,
the personal boycott 5 Named persons, 39 noncommercial organizations,40 and designated institutions 41 in this category are blacklisted because they are believed to be "pro-Zionist"-overtly sympathetic to Israel.
The Arab boycott against Israel is ostensibly coordinated and

orchestrated by the Central Boycott Office of the Arab League, 2

headquartered in Damascus, Syria. Regional boycott offices operate as governmental agencies within each boycotting state. 43 Fur45
44
thermore, a special legal fiat and sanction standardizations
37. The complicated legal implications of the tertiary boycott are well
demonstrated in AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS, AMERICAN LAW VS. THE ARAB BoycoTT (1975). See also Ludwig & Smith, supra note 35; Steiner, International
Boycotts and Domestic Order: American Involvement in the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1355 (1976).
38. The personal boycott has included practices such as blacklisting firms
known to have prominent Jews in management, blacklisting entertainers for being sympathetic to Israel, and even blacklisting motion pictures (e.g. "Exodus")
for their "pro-Zionist" content. See Guzzardi, The Curious Barrier on the Arab
Frontiers, FORTUNE, July 1975, at 84.
39. Those targeted include Elizabeth Taylor, Danny Kaye, Paul Newman,
Barbara Streisand, Otto Preminger, and Leon Uris. Guzzardi, supra note 38, at
84; Short, Trading With the Enemy, 60 MIDDLE E. INT'L 11, 11-13 (1976).
40. Targeted organizations include the American Committee for Boys Town,
Jerusalem; the American Jewish Committee; the American Jewish Congress; and
the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith.
41. Targeted institutions include the Brooklyn Apts, Inc. and the entire cities of Boston and Miami.
42. The Central Boycott Office (CBO) is administered by a Commissioner
General, who is appointed by the Secretary General of the Arab League and is
assisted by a delegate from each Arab League member's government. Each delegate acts as a liaison officer for his or her government. The CBO basically acts as
a secretariat whose responsibilities entail policy proposals and information gathering, analysis, and dissemination. See The Boycott of Israel Office, ARAB ECONOMIST, Apr. 1975, at 36; N. JOYNER, ARAB BoycoTT/ANTI-Boycorr 24 (1976).
43. Wide disparities in administrative purview exist among these regional
boycott agencies, primarily because each state defines and enforces boycott rules
within the parameter of its own government and executes national policy
through its own legislative and executive system. Multinational Corporations
and United States ForeignPolicy: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Multinational Corporationsof the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 213 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Multinational CorporationsHearings].
44. The Arab League imposed a specific legal sanction for violations of the
anti-Israel boycott by approving a "Unified Law on the Boycott of Israel." Resolution No. 849, Comment of the League of Arab States, Sess. 22-H (Dec. 11,
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foster the uniform application of the Arab League's boycott for
the blacklisting of suspected boycott noncompliers. 46

1954), reprinted in N. JOYNER, supra note 42, app. C. Provisions of the "Unified
Law" were subsequently incorporated into the domestic legislation of each member state. See General Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry & Agriculture
for Arab Countries, The Arab Boycott of Israel: Its Grounds and Regulations
(summary of boycott rules in the format of an undated letter from President
Abdul Aziz, H. al Sager) [hereinafter cited as The Arab Boycott of Israel], reprinted in Contempt ProceedingsAgainst Secretary of Commerce, Rodgers C.B.
Morton: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Poreign Commerce, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 14649 (1975).
45. The boycott against Israel is ostensibly applied by the Arab League in
accordance with a set of 40 "General Principles" covering various categories of
economic activities and transactions. While no official statement by the League
of Arab States or stipulated principles for the anti-Israel boycott exists, two recent compilations appear to be authoritative. See The Arab Boycott of Israel,
supra note 44; League of Arab Countries, General Secretariat, Head Office for
the Boycott of Israel, General Principlesfor Boycott of Israel, June 1972, [hereinafter cited as General Principles], reprinted in Multinational Corporations
Hearings, supra note 43, at 442-76.
46. The General Principles, supra note 45, state that any foreign company or
institution may be blacklisted for any of the following "offenses":
1. Directly or indirectly aiding Israel's economic growth or war potential;
2. Owning shares in an Israeli corporation;
3. Investing in an already blacklisted company;
4. Assembling products in Israel;
5. Licensing patents, trademarks, or copyrights to an Israeli firm;
6. Providing technical or managerial assistance to an Israeli firm;
7. Carrying out construction projects in Israel;
8. Establishing a general agency or main office for a company's Middle
Eastern operations in Israel, or entrusting this responsibility to an Israeli
firm or individual;
9. Failing to promptly answer inquiries from the Arab boycott authorities;
10. Manufacturing goods containing Israeli-made materials or components;
11. Importing Israeli goods for sale in commercial quantities while refusing
to offer Arab products for sale on the same basis;
12. Representing, selling, popularizing or assisting in any manner the commercialization of Israeli products;
13. Selling products that contain a motor or generator made by a blacklisted firm, or having components manufactured by a blacklisted firm worth
more than 35% of the unit cost value;
14. Selling stock to Israeli citizens or appointing an Israeli as a corporate
officer;
15. Using the Israeli Star of David as a trademark or using other names
and designs similar to those used by an Israeli firm;
16. Joining a foreign-Israeli chamber of commerce in Israel or abroad;
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Since the mid-1970s the Arab boycott has assumed added economic credibility through the massive accumulation of petrodollars generated by the Arab oil-producing governments' manifold
petroleum price increases.4 7 Arab "petro-politics" during this
time have raised serious questions regarding the legality of enforcing the anti-Israeli boycott, particularly as it relates to Western corporations and their concerns over government antitrust
statutes. 4s Accordingly, while a detailed, comprehensive analysis

17. Lending money or providing financial aid in any form to Israeli entities

(firms and officers);
18. Taking part in or supporting propaganda activities on behalf of Israel;
19. Constructing ships or tankers for Israel;
20. Engaging in a joint venture with an Israeli company;
21. Acting "for the account of Israel or in its interests"; or,
22. Becoming affiliated as parent, subsidiary, or partner with a blacklisted
company if the latter's interest exceeds 50% or leads to administrative
control.
Id., reprinted at 449-53.
47. See Joyner, The PetrodollarPhenomenon and Changing International
Economic Relations, 138 WORLD AFF. 152 (1975); see also Niehuss, Foreign Investment in the United States: A Review of Government Policy, 16 VA. J. INT'L
L. 75 (1975). For indications of the role that petrodollars played in enhancing
the Arab boycott's coercive influence upon United States trade, see generally
ForeignInvestment and Arab Boycott Legislation: Hearingson S. 425, Amendment No. 24 Thereto; S. 953, S. 995, and S. 1303 Before the Subcomm. on InternationalFinance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Investment and
Arab Boycott Hearings];Hearings on Foreign Investment in the United States
Before the Subcomm. on InternationalFinance of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings on Foreign Investment in the United States Before the Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974).
Significant amounts of petrodollars have found their way into the United
States as direct foreign investments. By late 1981, the Commerce Department
reported that total OPEC holdings were $69.8 billion, including $34.9 billion in
government securities, $6.1 billion in corporate bonds, $8.5 billion in corporate
stocks, and $13.9 billion in commercial bank liabilities. OPEC's Secrets, TIME,
Oct. 5, 1981, at 70. One analyst, David Mizrahi, claims that Saudi Arabia's investment holdings in the United States exceed $100 billion, those of Kuwait are
$55 billion, and those of the United Arab Emirates are $45 billion. Id.; see also
Dentzer, A Flood of Petrodollars,NEWSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1981, at 65-66; Arabs
Search Out More U.S. Deals, Bus. WK., Oct. 26, 1981, at 62-63. For a provocative account, see generally H. LEVNs, ARAB REACH: THE SECRET WAR AGAINST
ISRAEL

(1983).

48. See The Arab Boycott and American Business: Report by the Subcomm.

1984]

TRANSNATIONAL BOYCOTTS

of various states' legislative responses to the Arab boycott lies
outside the scope of this Article,4 9 due attention will be given to
considerations having special import to the legal parameters of
boycotts in general.5 0
E.

The United States

Through the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,5 1
in 1977 the United States Congress delegated to the President
certain powers for regulating foreign economic transactions during times of national emergency.52 That Act, and the amended
Trading with the Enemy Act,53 are the principal United States

on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter cited as The Arab Boycott
and American Business]; Discriminatory Arab Pressure on U.S. Business:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International Trade and Commerce of the
House Comm. on InternationalRelations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter cited as DiscriminatoryArab Pressureon U.S. Business Hearings];Hearings on the Effectiveness of FederalAgencies' Enforcement of Laws and Policies Against Compliance, By Banks and Other U.S. Firms, with the Arab
Boycott, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Multinational Corporations Hearings,
supra note 43.
49. National legislation to counteract discriminatory repercussions from the
anti-Israel boycott upon third-party states has been limited to the United
States, France, and the Netherlands. See Phillips, The Arab Boycott of Israel:
Possibilities for European Cooperation with U.S. Anti-boycott Legislation (1979)
(Congressional Research Service Document 79-215F); see also infra text accompanying notes 215-338.
50. See infra text accompanying notes 100-210.
51. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (1982).
52. Id. § 1702. See Marcuss & Richard, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction in
United States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 439, 460 (1981).
53. 50 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (1982). Section 5(b) provides in part:
(1) During the time of war, the President may, through any agency that
he may designate, or otherwise, and under such rules and regulations as he
may prescribe, by means of instructions, licenses, or otherwise(B) investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal,
transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising
any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving,
any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any
interest...
by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States....
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policy instruments for the imposition of boycott-related coercion
abroad, often labeled "embargoes." The Department of Treasury
administers these programs by focusing on certain critical facets
of transnational boycotts. Unless licensed otherwise, boycotts typically prohibit all financial transactions with the target state, all
transfers of property into the United States by the target state or
its nationals, and any transfer of property to a target state or its
nationals that is subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."
The Treasury Department is currently supervising at least five
boycott-related programs. First, the Foreign Assets Control Regulations 5 establish a boycott and embargo of United States trade
with North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Second, the Transaction Control Regulations 57 prohibit
the purchase or sale of strategic commodities in any foreign country when the transaction includes shipment to any state designated under the Foreign Assets Control Regulations.58 Third, the
Foreign Fund Control Regulations 9 block the movement of selected assets located in the United States that belong to Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Fourth,
the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 0 embargo all financial and
commercial transactions involving any property interest of Cuba
or a Cuban national, and prohibit the importation of any goods of

Id.
Since 1977 the applicable scope of the Trading with the Enemy Act has been
limited to times of war. Compare id. with 50 U.S.C. app. 5(b)(1) (1976)
(amended 1977) (granted the President the power to apply "[d]uring time of
war, or during any other period of national emergency declared by the Presi-

dent"). See generally Note, PresidentialEmergency Powers Related to International Economic Transactions: Congressional Recognition of Customary Authority, 11

VAND.

J. TnANSNAT'L L. 515 (1978).

54. Malloy, Embargo Programs of the United States Treasury Department,
20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 485, 496-97 (1981). The licensing of exceptions de-

volves to the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control. Id. at 49697.
55. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500.101-.809 (1983).
56. Part I of the Schedule to 31 C.F.R. § 500.201, designates the following
effective dates for the regulations' prohibitive application: North Korea (Dec. 17,
1950), North Vietnam (May 5, 1964), Cambodia (Apr. 17, 1975), and South Vietnam (Apr. 30, 1975).
57. 31 C.F.R. §§ 505.01-.60.
58. Id. § 505.10(b).
59. Id. §§ 520.01-.809.
60. Id. §§ 515.101-.809.
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Cuban origin. 6 ' Fifth, the Iranian Assets Control Regulations,6 2
promulgated in the wake of the Iranian hostage crisis, blocked
transfer of rights in any Iranian property within the jurisdiction
of the United States and forbade dealings with Iran.6 3 A comprehensive anti-Iranian trade embargo or boycott, however, was not
64
expressly intended by this action.
The recent utilization of transnational economic coercion by
the United States has emphasized embargo restrictions more than
boycott prohibitions. United States embargo and boycott pro-

grams, however, have not escaped criticism on grounds of both
commission and omission. 5 To better appreciate the legal status
of transnational boycotts, an appraisal of a boycott's generic character when wielded as a policy implement of economic coercion is
necessary.
III. THE TRANSNATIONAL BOYCOTT AS ECONOMIC
A.

COERCION

Taxonomy

The salient traits and prominent features common to most boycotts suggest the delineation of a general taxonomy for boycotts.
A boycott's situational focus, authority support, and targeted

61. Id. § 515.204.
62. Id. §§ 535.101-.904.
63. 31 C.F.R. § 535.201. The scope of the Iranian Assets regulations was cut
back by President Reagan. See Exec. Order No. 12,282, 46 FED. REG. 7,925
(1981).
64. See Office of the White House Press Secretary, Press Briefing by G. William Miller, Secretary of the Treasury 5 (Nov. 14, 1979) (copy on file at offices of
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW). A trade embargo was, however,
subsequently imposed against Iran by President Carter's Executive Order of
Apr. 7, 1980. Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 FED. REG. 24,099 (1980).
65. Commentators Stanley Marcuss and Eric Richard have come to the following conclusion regarding the Foreign Asset Control Regulations:
By imposing nearly absolute bans on certain exports from third countries by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations, and by failing to provide
for particularized analysis of the nationality of those subsidiaries or the
effect of the transactions on U.S. security, these regulations create the potential for interference with the sovereignty of other states without adequate justification.
Marcuss & Richard, supra note 52, at 482. They conclude a sweeping indictment
of United States extraterritorial economic coercion by positing that "[t]he failure of U.S. trade regulation laws to reflect a consistent theory of international
legal principles pertaining to jurisdiction is a serious impediment to the evolution of the rule of law in international trade." Id. at 483.
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market flow provide instructive characteristics for such a
delineation.
A boycott's situational focus may be either internal (domesticdirected), or external (foreign-directed). If the boycotters and the
target group are members of the same political society, a boycott,
is considered internal. If a boycotting faction and the target
group are from different political societies, the boycott is considered external.6
A boycott's sources of support may be either official (government-sanctioned), or unofficial (civilian-sponsored). If a government enacts legislation or imposes fiats to enforce boycott regulations, an official boycott exists.68 On the other hand, if a
government remains politically aloof from an internal boycott
movement, or permits private groups to organize a boycott, the
boycott is unofficial.("
A boycott may be directed at a target state's economic demand
(consumption pattern), or its supply (production capability).
Most commonly, one state simply refuses to purchase specified
goods from another state.7 0 The principal facet of a boycott could
also be the curtailed export of selected commodities to the target
state.7 1 A third possibility is for a boycott to encompass aspects of
both supply and demand; in this instance the boycott might be
labeled compound. As a boycott becomes more prolonged, the unavoidable strain in diplomatic relations between the imposing
state and the target state increases the likelihood of a compound
66. Examples of an internal boycott are the numerous citizen movements by
China against resident Japanese and the actions taken by Indians in 1905 and

1930 to harm local British merchants. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying
text.
67. COMECON's regional estrangement of Yugoslavia, Great Britain's action
against Iran, and the Arab boycott against Israel illustrate the external boycott.
See supra text accompanying notes 22-49.
68. COMECON's boycott of Yugoslavia (1948-1955) and the ongoing Arab
League boycott against Israel are examples of official boycotts. See supra text
accompanying notes 22-24, 31-50.

69. Boycotting episodes by the Chinese, Indians, and Turks clearly assumed
the popular support characteristic of unofficial boycotts. See supra text accom-

panying notes 13-21.
70. Cf. supra notes 13-49 and accompanying text.

71. This becomes tantamount to a quasi-embargo, which happened in the
case of COMECON's trade with Yugoslavia during the early 1950s. See supra

text accompanying notes 22-24.
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boycott.

2

The transnational boycott can be described as a mode of passive resistance which is employed as a weapon against the foreign
trade of one nation in order to secure governmental redress for
what the boycotter deems to be legitimate grievances. In this respect, there are three features intrinsic to transnationai boycotts:
(1) boycotts necessarily must involve concerted action, the effects
of which are intended to transcend national boundaries; (2) boycotts are primarily, though not exclusively, economic in nature,
and entail a premeditated refusal to purchase or trade designated
goods and services from target states; and (3) as acts of coercion,
boycotts represent a means to an end and not an end in themselves. Thus, boycotts possess special characteristics as instruments of dispute, having as their immediate purpose subjection of
the target state to pervasive social inconvenience and substantial
economic loss.
B. Efficacy
The utility of a boycott depends primarily upon its efficacy in
inflicting the intended adverse economic consequences upon foreign trade of the target state. 3 A boycott's effectiveness, however,
must not be confused with its success. A boycott may be effective
in severing commercial relations with the target state, and yet be
incapable of bringing about the desired change in the target
state's foreign policy behavior. 4 Similarly, a boycott is unlikely to
succeed unless it can muster at least some degree of effectiveness.
72. This was precisely the case in both the Chinese boycott against Japan
and the ongoing boycott of Israel by the Arab League states. See supra text
accompanying notes 13, 31-49.
73. Admittedly, precise quantitative determinations of a boycott's effect is
difficult to determine. Trade statistics, when available, are not always reliable
because they often are "adjusted" or suitably "reinterpreted" by governments to
skew or distort the true commercial effect of a boycott. Measuring boycott-related trade interruptions using currency values expressed as "trade loss indicators" may be graphically instructive as an heuristic device, but these figures cannot be regarded as either comprehensive or accurate indicators of a boycott's
efficacy because they fail to account for trade between the boycotting state and
the target state through third parties. For an illustration of the difficulties incurred in attempting to calculate such impacts, see A. SPANDAU, ECONoMIc BoycoTTs AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA: NORMATIVE AND FAcTuAL IssuEs 132 (1979).

74. The Arab League boycott of Israel, notwithstanding its relatively sophisticated composition and regulation, is a good example. See supra text accompanying notes 31-48.
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Historically, certain factors stand out as important indices of a
boycott's success against the target state: (1) the target state's total share in market demand supply; (2) alternative markets or
sources of supply for the boycotted goods; (3) availability of substitutes for the boycotted goods; (4) positive identification for the
boycotted goods; (5) organization of the boycott; (6) selection of
economically significant target goods or services; (7) reasonable
integration of the law into the boycott; and (8) the sense of injustice felt by the boycotters. While each point does not pertain
equally to every boycott, they all contribute to a boycott's overall
efficacy.
If a boycott is to be effective and successful, the boycotting
group must comprise a sensitive segment of the target state's attainable market. In other words, the greater the purchasing power
or supply potential of a boycotter coalition, the greater the likelihood that the boycott will have an effect on the supply or demand
of the targeted goods. 6
The extent to which alternative sources of supply or market
outlets are available for boycotted goods will significantly affect a
boycott's success. The more difficult it is for the target state to
secure access to supplementary markets or sources of supply, the
greater the chances of a boycott's success. 6
In consumer or demand boycotts, the absence of price competitive substitutes makes it harder for boycotters to do without the
targeted goods. Conversely, in supply-oriented boycotts, the lack
of substitutes for boycotted products forces the target state to import replacement goods which increases the potential that the
boycott will have a significant adverse economic effect on the target state.7
The precise designation of boycotted goods, facilitated by a
convenient method of identifying those goods, enables boycotters

75. This was the case in both Great Britain's boycott against Iran's petroleum trade and the Arab oil-producing governments' strategy to use petroleum

revenues at the secondary and tertiary levels of the boycott against Israel. See
supra notes 25-48 and accompanying text.

76. The case of Iran during the British boycott of 1951-1953 is illustrative.
See supra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
77. The failure of boycotts to achieve these results probably accounts for the
relatively insignificant impact of the Chinese boycotts against Japan during

1908, 1915, 1923, and 1928, and for the lack of success of India's boycotts against
Great Britain. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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to enforce more rapidly and definitely a boycott operation.7 8
The active participation of skilled management on behalf of
boycotters is critical for coordinating and regulating a boycott.
The more efficient a boycott's organization, the greater its potential for inflicting serious damage on the target state. 9
A boycott's effectiveness depends to a large degree upon how
seriously the reduction in foreign trade affects a target state's
economy. The boycotted goods or services must have a significant
place in the target state's economy. For example, while a boycott
of petroleum may produce quick and meaningful results, a boycott of black pepper or oregano could not be expected to have a

similar effect.80
The extent to which the law of the boycotting state is reasona-

bly integrated into a boycott can be crucial in facilitating the boycott's success. Official sanction and legislative regulations not only

contribute to a boycott's enforcement, but also establish its legiti-

macy."1 If, on the other hand, a government were to legislate
harsh anti-boycott penalties and repressive ordinances, these devices would surely discourage widespread participation in the
82
boycott.

78. For example, under the Arab boycott, a company's response to the Central Boycott Office's request for certain documents of identification may determine whether or not the company will be placed on the blacklist. One accepted
response is to furnish a negative certificate of origin certifying that neither the
goods shipped, nor their components, are of Israeli origin. See N. JOYNER, supra
note 42, at 3-4. An information request usually contains the following questions:
1. Do you have main or branch factories, assembly plants, or joint ventures
in Israel?
2. Do you hold shares in Israeli companies?
3. Do you provide technical assistance or consultative services to Israel?
4. Do you maintain general agencies or main offices in Israel for Middle East
operations?
5. Do you license technology to Israel?
6. Are you prospecting for natural resources in Israel?
7. Are you acting as the principal importer or agency for Israeli goods?
Foreign Investment and Arab Boycott Hearings, supra note 47, at 21 (statement of John K. Tabor, Undersecretary of Commerce at the time of the hearings). Failure to respond is deemed an admission of guilt and warrants blacklisting. See H. HASSOUNA, supra note 36, at 469.

79. For examples of organizational efforts, see supra notes 13, 27-30, 31-48
and accompanying text.
80. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 44-48.
81. See supra note 43.
82. This has been the intention underlying the United States attitude to-
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A critical element in the efficacy and success of any boycott is
the emotional factor that fuels its implementation. The sense of
injustice and psychological injury felt by the boycotters will determine the degree of their personal motivation and commitment
to a boycott campaign. The more intense the popular conviction
favoring a boycott's cause, the more willing the boycott participants will be to endure the resultant economic burdens and self83
sacrifice.
C.

Negative Considerations

Thus far, the political ramifications of boycotts have been cast
in a positive light. Several negative aspects of transnational boycotts do exist, however, and they should not be disregarded. First,
because they represent a form of denial, boycotts by definition
leave any initiative of response to the opposition. 4 In addition,
the time-consuming nature of boycotts necessitates reliance upon
continued social pressure exerted over considerable lengths of
time. 5 Extraterritorial boycotts are costly and their supporters
must incur substantial trade losses if the boycotts are to have any

ward nonprimary facets of the Arab boycott against Israel. See infra text accompanying notes 218-46.
83. Undoubtedly, "injustice" was the paramount motivation fomenting the

several Chinese boycotts against Japan, the Indian boycotts against Great Britain, and the Turkish reaction to Austria's annexation of Bosnia. See supra text
accompanying notes 13-21. A good example of a politically motivated transnational boycott is the Arab League's action against Israel. Abdul Raham Azzam
Bey, Secretary of the Arab League, announced that the League's member states
would institute a boycott against all Jewish-produced goods from Palestine. Bey
averred that the boycott was necessary because Jewish industry in Palestine "is
based on Zionist funds collected in foreign countries to serve a political purpose:

the establishment of a Jewish national home and state in Palestine. This purpose is not realizable except by the exploitation of markets in Arab countries." 2
Esco FOUNDATION FOR PALESTINE, PALESTINE: A STUDY OF JEWISH, ARAB AND

BRITISH POLICIES 1205 (1947). See also W. QUANDT, F. JABBER & E. LESCH, THE
POLITICS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM (1973).

84. Jewish reaction in the United States in recent years to the "unjust" antiIsraeli boycott has been virulent, intense, and largely successful in promoting
the passage of antiboycott legislation. See infra text accompanying notes 218-63.
85. Three of the Chinese boycotts persisted at least two years (1919-1921,
1927-1928, and 1931-1933), the COMECON boycott of Yugoslavia lasted for
nearly seven years (1948-1955), and the Arab boycott against Israel has been in
effect for more than thirty-five years. See supra notes 13, 22-24, 31-48 and accompanying text.

TRANSNATIONAL BOYCOTTS

19841

significant effect. 88 Finally, boycotts are inefficient because they
often affect many consumers who are not involved in the dispute
and who have negligible influence over policies of the targeted
87
state.

IV.

THE TRANSNATIONAL

A.

BoYcoTT

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The Transnational Boycott as Intervention

More than two centuries ago, the eminent Swiss legal philosopher, Emmerich de Vattel, posited that:
Every state has consequently a right to prohibit the entrance of
foreign merchandises; and the nations that are affected by such
prohibition have no right to complain of it, as if they had been
refused an office of humanity.
Since then a nation cannot have a natural right to sell her merchandises to another that is unwilling to purchase them,- since
she has only an imperfect right to buy what she wants of
others,-since it belongs only to these last to judge whether it be
proper for them to sell or not-and, finally, since commerce consists in mutually buying and selling all sorts of commodities,--it is
evident that it depends on the will of any nation to carry on commerce with another, or to let it alone. If she be willing to allow this
to one, it depends on the nation to permit it under such conditions
as she shall think proper. For in permitting another nation to trade
with her, she grants that other a right; and every one is at liberty
to affix what conditions he pleases to a right which he grants of his
own accord.88
de Vattel's observations highlight the frequently made assertion that international commercial dealings lie within the prerog-

atives of national sovereignty. International law assigns to each
state, as an incident of its sovereignty, the right to choose the

economic policies that will govern its relations with trading partners. 89 Even so, when a state intentionally uses its extraterritorial
86. Not surprisingly, trade losses incurred by the boycotting state are rarely
admitted, and statistics concerning such losses are generally unavailable.
87. See D. LOSMAN, A CONSIDERATION OF BOYCOTTS IN INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC SANCTIONS: THE CASES OF CUBA, ISRAEL, AND RHODESIA

124-40 (1979).

88. E. DE VATTEL, supra note 10, at 38-39.
89. See C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 249-52 (4th ed. 1965); 1 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 205-09 (1945); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 286-90
(8th ed. 1955).
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policies as cudgels for the attainment of foreign policy goals or to
register transnational protest, certain implications arise for the
law of the affected nations. When transnational boycotts are
wielded intentionally by a government to coerce the sovereign will
of another government, those policies are considered interventionary-premeditated dictatorial interference into the affairs of the
target state.9 0 It is patently obvious that transnational boycotts
entail interference into another state's sovereign realm. Although
transnational boycotts constitute extraterritorial intervention,
they are not ipso facto illegal instruments of economic coercion
pursuant to international law. The circumstances under which a
boycott is implemented, the motivations underlying its use, and
the degree of severity it assumes will determine a boycott's legal
status.
The intent underlying a nation's imposition of a transnational
boycott is, therefore, a principal consideration in determining the
legality of a boycott."1 When a state willfully implements a boycott policy, particular objectives are sought by that state. If a
state, obligated under international law to abstain from boycott
activities, nevertheless initiates or supports a boycott, the primary objective of which is to cause a direct and unjustified interference in the affairs of a nonconsenting target state, the boycott
may violate well-established international law principles.92 On the
other hand, when a transnational boycott is utilized by a state as
an instrument of intervention, the boycott may be deemed legal if
it was exercised in self-defense, or as a means of self-help to redress injuries inflicted upon that state.

90. See J. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONs 402 (6th ed. 1963); 1 L. OPPENmEIM,
supra note 89, at 305; 5 M. WHrIEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 452-53

(1965); Fenwick, Intervention: Individual and Collective, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 645
(1945). See generally Burke, The Legal Regulation of Minor International Co-

ercion: A Framework for Inquiry, in ESSAYS ON INTERVENTION 87 (R. Stranger
ed. 1964).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 138-39.
92. Commentators have argued that for intervention to be illegal under international law, the use or threat of force must be made against a territory. See,
e.g., H.

KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 64 (1952); T. LAWRENCE,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (6th ed. 1913); E. STOWELL, INTERVENTION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 318 n.48 (1921).
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1. Justifiable Intervention
a. Self-defense
The right of self-defense is universally acknowledged and accepted in international law.93 A boycott undertaken when specific
circumstances demand self-defense assumes the legal status
granted by international law. To attain this legitimacy, a transnational boycott must rest upon those factors that render intervention for purposes of self-defense legal: the boycott must be enacted against a state whose attack or impending attack was
objectively illegal; the danger must have been direct and immediate; and the boycott must adhere to the grounds of necessity and
proportionality by being a just response and clearly not excessive
94
in relation to the threat.

b. Securing redress
Boycotts undertaken to secure adequate redress after an injury
has been inflicted upon one state by another state may also be
legal under international law. Because international law is relatively primitive, self-help remains the preeminent authorized
sanction and the principal means of legal enforcement. The transnational boycott is a valid means of self-help when used by a
state to secure redress for an injustice done to it. Used in this
manner, a boycott entails a limited interference by the wronged
state into the sovereign interests of the alleged transgressor state
in order to economically coerce the latter to meet its international
obligations and duties to the former.
93. See generally D. BowmTr, SELF-DEFENSE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-25
(1958); M. WHrrEMAN, supra note 90, at 966-1048 (1965).
94. For a discussion of factors legitimizing self-defense, see 1 L. OPPENHEIM,
supra note 89, at 297-304. D.W. Bowett has observed the following characteristics typifying the right of self-defense:
(1) The right of self-defence lies against conduct by states which is
delictual as being in breach of a duty established by international law.
(2) The exercise of the right of self-defence presupposes the absence of
any alternative means of protection for certain essential rights of the state
which are endangered.
(3) The danger to those rights must be serious, and must be actual or
imminent.
(4) The measures of self-defence taken must be reasonable, limited to
the necessity of protection, and proportionate to the danger.
D. Bownrr, supra note 93, at 269.
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(i.) Retorsion-As a foreign policy instrument of redress, the
95
transnational boycott may be classified as a method of retorsion.
In international law, retorsion is an inimical form of retaliation
taken by one government in response to another government's
discourteous, unfair, unkind, or inequitable action. It is important
to note that the act prompting retorsion is not illegal, but merely
unfriendly." Retorsion implies that the retaliation for some noxious, albeit legal, act will be by resort to a noxious, albeit legal,
act of similar degree. 97 Consequently, the transnational boycott
employed as a vehicle of retorsion is inherently legal. When retorsion can be properly employed, however, is not easy to ascertain
precisely. Frequently, difficulties arise from the parties' differing
perceptions as to the extent of a discourtesy or the gravity of an
unfriendly act. Thus, a government's ability to legally justify a
transnational boycott by retorsion rests substantially upon the
merits and circumstances of each separate instance of
provocation.
(ii.) Reprisal-Pursuant to international law, transnational
boycotts enacted as sanctions are legally permissible if effected
against a state that is guilty of contravening international law.
Boycotts imposed in retaliation by an injured state to secure redress against the transgressor state are labeled reprisals and are
allowed. It is contrary to international law, however, for a state to
use a boycott to coerce the sovereign will of another state or to
obtain any undue advantages from it. 98
2. Illegal Intervention
a. Generally
A fundamental norm of international law is a state's sovereign
right to independence in conducting both its domestic and its foreign policies. 9 Illicit intervention under international law, there95. For a discussion of retorsion, see 2 C. HYDE, supra note 89, § 588; 2 L.
supra note 10, at 134-35; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW
WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 368 (1972)
(repaginated reprint of 8th ed. 1866).
96. See C. FENWICK, supra note 89, at 635-36; 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note

OPPENHEIM,

76-77 (1945); H.

10, at 134; G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 95, at 76.
97. 2 L. OPPENHEIM, supra note 10, at 135; H. WHEATON, supra note 95, at
368-69.
98. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
99.

See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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fore, is not limited to interference in the internal affairs of other
states. If the national policies of one state unduly or dictatorially
contravene another state's external affairs, such an intervention
may be deemed illegal. A state's external independence-including a state's right to determine what relations to
pursue with other states-is as important as its internal independence. Resort to a boycott, therefore, may constitute an undue or
excessive interference into both the internal and external affairs
of the target state, particularly if that boycott were made extraordinarily severe by its comprehensive coverage, strict compliance,
or rigorous enforcement.
When the essence of a boycott's economic intervention becomes
intentional compulsion, its legality may become susceptible to
challenge and criticism. 100 A transnational boycott that exerts excessive economic coercion, or seeks as its paramount purpose to
influence certain behavior by imposing its dictatorial will, exceeds
the parameters of legality. Such a boycott does not fall within the
ambit of either self-defense or legitimate redress, but instead,
tends more toward illegal economic intervention and should be
construed as such.
b. Injury to third party states
A transnational boycott that intentionally interferes with the
trading patterns of a state which has committed no offense
against the instigating government may be legally suspect. Depending upon the severity and reach of the interference, such a
boycott may be considered excessive and injurious by affected
third-party states and, therefore, be branded as an illegal foreign
policy of economic coercion.
In a related vein, the legality of a transnational boycott having
multiple levels may be impugned if it interferes with the domestic
domain of a disinterested third-party state. Each state retains the
undisputed sovereign right to construct its own internal laws and
regulations for governing natural and legal persons under its national jurisdiction. 101 When the secondary or tertiary levels of a
transnational boycott impinge upon the ability of a nontargeted,
third-party state to maintain its inherent legal competence, the
100. This has undoubtedly been the case with the Arab boycott of Israel. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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boycott's reach may be deemed excessive and, if severe enough,
may abrogate the fundamental legal norm of nonintervention. For
example, if State A boycotts State B and instigates a secondary
transnational boycott that affects corporations of State C trading
with State B, that boycott would not necessarily be illegal because State A does not have to trade with either State B or any
other state's corporate entities if it so chooses." 2
Suppose, however, that in the process of boycotting State B,
State A threatens or attempts to curtail trade with those corporations of State C that trade with other corporations of State C,
who in turn trade with State B. In such a tertiary boycott case,
State A would be enforcing a restraint of trade between corporations of State C, designed to injure State B. In this situation,
State A could be intervening illegally into the domestic affairs of
State C if its actions violate State C's domestic antitrust laws.103
c. Discriminatory boycotts
The status of a transnational boycott instigated for, or motivated by, overt discriminatory considerations is less clear under
international law. A transnational boycott undertaken for the express purpose of curtailing trade with some other state on
grounds of religious, ethnic, or racial prejudice is legal because
such a boycott still lies within a state's sovereign prerogative to
trade with whomever it pleases. This realization does not imply,
however, that a discriminatory boycott should be morally
respected or condoned by the international community. An expressly discriminatory boycott cannot help but violate the spirit
of international law and undermine respect for accepted standards and emergent legal principles associated with the minimum
of human rights. 1 4
Similarly, if State A's secondary and tertiary level boycott is
102. See infra notes 101-24 and accompanying text. The boycott would be
illegal if it violated existing valid treaties or contracts.
103. In recent years, governments have fashioned legislative responses to
deal with possible antitrust violations. See infra notes 215-63, 277-304 and ac-

companying text.
104. See generally L.

SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973); Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction,
124 RE CUEIL DEs Couns 375 (1968); Falk, Responding to Severe Violations, in
ENHANCING GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS 207 (J. Dominguez ed. 1979); Sohn, The New
InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States,
32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
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motivated by discriminatory religious, ethnic, or racial considerations, the gravity of its transgression would probably be compounded. If disciminatory criteria are employed by State A as
guideline considerations for application by State C's corporations
in restraint of their trade, the lawfulness of State A's boycott operation becomes openly suspect on at least two counts. First, the
imposition of such dictatorial sway by State A would per force
foster discriminatory actions by and among legal persons in State
C.105 Second, this interference by State A into the trade of State

C would amount to an excessive use of unmitigated economic coercion falling outside the permissible bounds of self-defense,
rights and redress, or mere commercial estrangement as provided
for in international law. 106 Consequently, the secondary and tertiary levels of State A's composite boycott could be appropriately
criticized for their illicit character.
In conclusion, the legal status of transnational boycotts can be
considered in much the same way as the legality of intervention is
appraised in international law. The general right of a state to enact a boycott as an economic policy is circumscribed by the rule
that a boycott may be employed only as a sanction in support of
the law, not as a measure designed solely to coerce or to inflict
injury upon another state. Whether or not a boycott will be legally characterized as intervention depends upon both the nature
of the boycott and the purpose for which the boycott was
undertaken.
B. The Transnational Boycott in Treaty Law
In global economic relations, treaties play a paramount role in
facilitating, sustaining, and regulating trade between and among
states.
1. Bilateral Treaties
The current popularity of bilateral agreements is evidenced by
the considerable number of friendship, commerce, and navigation
(FCN) treaties in force, the fundamental purposes of which are
the continuation of free trade and the perpetuation of amicable
105. This appears to have been the case with the Arab boycott of Israel. See
infra text accompanying notes 233-38.
106. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
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commercial relations. 10 7 These agreements normally contain provisions that grant most-favored-nation treatment for exports and
imports between both contracting nations.101 There is typically a
nondiscrimination stipulation that forbids the imposition of a
boycott unless a similar restriction is made applicable to like imports from, or exports to, all other countries. 109 A boycott instigated by a state that is party to such a treaty may be in violation
of international law on the grounds that the boycott is a breach of
the fundamental norm of pacta sunt servanda, a principle mean107. See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953,
United States-Japan, 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863.
108. For example:
Nationals and companies of either Party shall be accorded national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to access to the
courts of justice and to administrative tribunals and agencies within the
territories of the other Party, in all degrees of jurisdiction, both in pursuit
and in defense of their rights. It is understood that companies of either
Party not engaged in activities within the territories of the other Party
shall enjoy such access therein without registration or similar
requirements.
Id. art. IV para. 1.
109. For example:
2. Neither Party shall impose restrictions or prohibitions on the importation of any product of the other Party, or on the exportation of any
product to the territories of the other Party, unless the importation of the
like product of, or the exportation of the like product to, all third countries is similarly restricted or prohibited.
3. If either Party imposes quantitative restrictions on the importation
or exportation of any product in which the other Party has an important
interest:... (b) If it makes allotments to any third country, it shall afford
such other Party a share proportionate to the amount of the product, by
quantity or value, supplied by or to it during a previous representative
period, due consideration being given to any special factors affecting the
trade in such product....
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3(b) of the present Article, a Party may apply restrictions or controls on importation and
exportation of goods that have effect equivalent to, or which are necessary
to make effective, exchange restrictions applied pursuant to Article XII.
However, such restrictions or controls shall depart no more than necessary
from the aforesaid paragraphs and shall be conformable with a policy
designed to promote the maximum development of nondiscriminatory foreign trade and to expedite the attainment both of a balance-of-payments
position and of monetary reserves which will obviate the necessity of such
restrictions.
Id., art. XIV.
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ing agreements of the parties must be observed. 110
2.

Multilateral Conventions

a. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is more
closely related to the totality of international commercial conduct."" Negotiated in 1947, GATT currently counts eighty-eight
countries as contracting parties, including most major non-communist nations." 2 The widespread acceptance of GATT as a
mechanism for governing international trade is founded upon the
belief that some regulatory instrument is essential for dissuading
national political leaders from pursuing limited policies of economic self-interest-policies that eventually might lead to retaliatory action and a sharp, chaotic decline in the volume of international commerce.'"
The original GATT convention clearly was designed to ensure
that all contracting states had access to international markets and
that the erection of discriminatory barriers in foreign commercial
dealings would be prohibited. Intriguing questions about the role
of transnational boycotts are raised by GATT provisions that
guarantee the availability of exports to all participating countries.
For example:
No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other
charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export
licenses or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by
any contracting party or on the importation of any product of the
territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or
sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any
other contracting party.'"
110. Accord Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. XXVI, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, 289 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention] reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969). See generally Wehberg, Pacta Sunt
Servanda, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 775 (1959); Kunz, The Meaning and the Range of
the Norm Pacta Sunt Servanda, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 180, 180-81 (1945).
111. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 266 [hereinafter cited as GATT].
112. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TRATEs IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIEs AND
OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY

1, 1982, 237 (1982) (DOS Pub. 351). Several other states have officially expressed
various forms of diplomatic intent or interest in GATT. Id.

113. See

J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF

114. GATT, supra note 111, art. XI.

GATT § 1.3 (1969).
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A member of GATT is thus enjoined from imposing boycotts and
other export controls except in certain designated circumstances,11 5 during which any restriction must be made applicable
to similar products from "all third countries."'1

6

GATT also al-

lows special exceptions to the unilateral export curtailments for
"the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such meawith restrictions on dosures are made effective in conjunction
' '1 7
consumption.
or
production
mestic
It should be noted that GATT contains a national security exception in article XXI, which declares that the Convention should
not be construed as precluding "any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of
its essential security interests.

. . [when]

taken in time of war or

other emergency in international relations." l 8 Consequently, a
transnational boycott by a party to GATT could be sustained as a
legitimate act of foreign policy if it is initiated during a condition
of belligerency or "other emergency. ' 119
115. These circumstances allow measures:
I. (a) necessary to protect public morals; (b) necessary to protect human,
animal, or plant life or health; (c) relating to the importation or exportation of gold or silver; ...

(e) relating to the products of prison labor; (f)

imposed for the protection of national treasures of artistic, historic or
archaeological value ....
II. (a) essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or
local short supply ....
Id. art. XX.
116. Id. art. XIII, para.(i).
117. Id. art. XX, para.(g). It is important to note that a qualifying provision
would negate these restrictions should they be applied "in a manner which
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between
countries where the same conditions prevail." Id. at art. XX.
118. Id. at art. XXI, para.(b)(iii). Other security interests included are activities relating to fissionable materials and to traffic in arms, ammunition, and the
implements of war. Id. at para.(b)(i)-(ii).
119. Although he concedes the need for national security qualifications in
GATT's provisions, one expert commentator on the legal facets of GATT has
posited that the exceptions expressed in articles XX and XXI create a "dangerous loophole to the obligations of GATT." J. JACKSON, supra note 113, § 28.4.
Another authority has asserted that article XXI has "effectively vitiated" all the
principles represented by GATT's promulgation. See Hearingson Economic Impact of Petroleum Shortages before the Subcomm. on InternationalEconomics
of the Joint Economic Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 157 (1973) (statement of
Professor Richard N. Gardner, Professor of Law and International Organizations, Columbia University). See generally C. BERGSTEN, COMPLETING THE
GATT: TowARD NEW INTERNATIONAL RuLEs TO GOVERN ExPoRT CONTROLS
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b. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
A second multinational instrument used to determine the legal
status of a transnational boycott is the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties. 120 Article 52 of the Vienna Convention provides:
"A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat
or use of force in violation of the principles of international law
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.

1 21

Article 52 is

augmented in the treaty's Annex by the Resolution Relating to
the Declaration on the Prohibition of Military, Political or Economic Coercion in the Conclusion of Treaties.1 2 This resolution
provides:
The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties ...
Solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form,

whether military, political, or economic, by any State in order to
coerce another State to perform any act relating to the conclusion
of a treaty in violation of the principles of the sovereign equality of
States and freedom of consent ... 111
Unlike GATT, these two Vienna Treaty provisions unmistakably
stipulate that a nation's resort to force-including economic coercion such as the use of a transnational boycott-to secure a treaty
agreement is illegal under international law. Should a state seek
to compel such an agreement, the treaty would automatically be
abrogated.124

(1974).
120. Vienna Convention, supra note 110.
121. Id. art. 52. For an extensive bibliography of the legislative history behind the textual evolution of article 52, see S. ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATiES:
A GUME

TO THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE VIENNA CONVENTION

286-89 (1970).

See also Partridge, Politicaland Economic Coercion: Within the Ambit of Article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties?, 5 INT'L LAW. 755
(1971).
122. U.N. Doc. A/7697 (1969), reprinted in S. ROSENNE, supra note 121, at
432.
123. Id. (emphasis in original).
124. Notwithstanding the illegality of such an act, there remains some uncertainty whether article 52 and its companion Declaration represent the codification of existing international law or merely indicate the direction in which the
law is proceeding. See Sinclair, Vienna Conference on the Law of Treaties, 19
INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 47, 49-50 (1970).
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C. The Transnational Boycott in United Nations Law
1. The Charter and "Economic Force"
Three United Nations Charter provisions, article 2, section 4;
article 39; and article 51, are intrinsic to the United Nations fundamental purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter circumscribes one
of the most cherished sovereign possessions of a state: the "use of

force" in its international conduct. 1 25 This accomplishment has

been described by one contemporary legal scholar as the creation
of the "principal norm of international law in our time."' 26 Nonetheless, the term use of force is undefined, unspecified, and consequently,

open

to

wide

interpretation. 12 7

The

types

of

force-military, economic, social, cultural, or political-that are
prohibited under this provision is an open question.
Because nations have often chosen transnational boycotts as
the means to achieve foreign policy objectives, one might deduce
that economic methods of coercion (and political, social, and cultural influences as well) should be subsumed under the prohibitions of article 2(4).128 This conclusion, however, contains a number of inconsistencies.
125. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. Article 2(4) directs "all members [to] refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other matter
inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Id. (emphasis added).
126. Henkin, The Reports of the Death of Article 2(4) Are Greatly Exaggerated, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 544, 544 (1971). But cf. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)?
Or: Changing Norms Governing the Use of Force by States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L.
809 (1970).
127. See Comment, The Use of Nonviolent Coercion: A Study in Legality
Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations, 122 U. PA. L. REv.
983, 987 (1974). Cf. Brosehe, The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile: Economic and Political Coercion and the Charter of the
United Nations, 7 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 3 (1974); Claude, The United Nations and the Use of Force, 532 INT'L CONCILIATION 325 (1961).
128. For representative views of this proposition, see D. Bowzrr, supra note
93, at 147, 176; H. KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNrTED NATIONs 726-31 (1950); M.
McDOUGAL & E. FEUCIANO, supra note 1, at 124-29. During the 1945 United

Nations Conference on International Organization in San Francisco, Brazil proposed an amendment that would have extended the scope of article 2(4) to include "the threat or use of economic measures in any manner inconsistent with
the purposes of the United Nations." This proposal, however, was rejected. See
Doc. 215, 1/1/10, 6 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 525, 549 (1945); Doc. 784, 1/1/27, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 331, 334-35 (1945).
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First, a broad interpretation of the term "force," which includes economic forms of coercion such as a boycott, gives rise to
the immediate problem of reconciling article 2(4) with article 51,
the U.N. Charter's self-defense provision. 129 Resort to self-defense
is restricted to instances in which armed attacks have occurred. If
article 2(4) were to include the economic coercion of a boycott in
its definition of force, and if a state were to apply such economic
coercion against another state, the target state would have no legal recourse of self-defense. A serious textual incongruity would
be created in the U.N. Charter; the target state would be the victim of illegal force, but would not be availed of any legally exercisable right of self-defense under article 51.130

Second, article 39 entrusts the Security Council with the responsibility for determining "the existence of any threat to the
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression," in order that it
may take or recommend measures "to restore international peace
and security."' 31 The wording of article 39 suggests that the framers of the U.N. Charter intended this provision to pertain only to
armed incidents of coercion. 1 2 If article 39 was interpreted expansively to embrace economic coercion as "threats" or "aggression,"' 3s the Security Council would be empowered with a discretionary authority so great that many states would find the
concession of sovereignty unacceptable.""
The scope of the term "aggression" under article 39, therefore,

129.

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of indi-

vidual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of
the United Nations. . . ." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
130. See Kunz, Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the
Charterof the United Nations, 41 AM. J. Irsr'L L. 872 (1947).

131. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
132. See I. BRowNLE, INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES

361 (1963).
133. The philosophy that economic measures of coercion should be handled
by the Security Council, rather than the General Assembly, was reaffirmed by
the International Court of Justice in the Expenses Case. Advisory Opinion on
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.C.J. 163. See also Lillich, The
Status of Economic Coercion Under International Law: United Nations
Norms, 12 TEx. INT'L L. J. 17 (1977).
134. The United States and other Western industrialized democracies surely
would withhold consent from such a development, because any Security Council
inaction on an issue of "economic aggression" might lead to the transfer of an
extraordinary amount of power to the majority group of 77 states controlling the
General Assembly, by means of the Uniting for Peace Resolution.
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is similar to the question of the meaning of "force" as used in
article 2(4). It is unclear what substantive criteria the international community must use in apolitically determining the legality of a national economic boycott policy under either U.N. Charter provision. Any satisfactory solution of these issues necessitates
the creation and universal acceptance of a judgmental norm of
behavior. This behavioral norm would require the delicate balancing of a number of factors including the intensity, purpose, and
actual nature of the coercive act.135 It is very doubtful that such a
behavioral norm could ever be applied impartially by all members
of the United Nations to all boycotts alleged to be economically
coercive, especially in light of the strained relations that exist between lesser developed countries and industrialized Western
nations. 136
In summary, the U.N. Charter articles provide inadequate criteria for defining the legal boundaries of a transnational boycott.
The lack of definitional specificity, the inconsistencies between
articles within the U.N. Charter, and the present volatile political
climate all prevent the U.N. Charter provisions from delineating
boundaries for the coercive use of a transnational boycott. Despite the U.N. Charter's ineffectiveness in dealing with transnational boycotts, the United Nations itself has long perceived the
serious implications of employing economic coercion as a tool for
the advancement of national foreign policy objectives.'3 7 In fact,
the United Nations General Assembly has expressly condemned
such acts in various declarations and resolutions.

135. Comment, supra note 127, at 988-93.
136. For reactions to the perceived Third World "threat" to the Western
members of the United Nations, see A. YESELSON & A. GAGLIONE, A DANGEROUS
PLACE: THE UNITED NATONS AS A WEAPON IN WORLD POLrrICS (1974); Falk, The
American Attack on the United Nations: An Interpretation,16 HARV. Isr'L

L.J. 566 (1975).
137. See supra note 126 and accompanying text. The Organization of American States (OAS) also incorporated the notion of economic coercion into its
Charter: "No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures of an
economic or political character in order to force the sovereign will of another

State and obtain from it advantages of any kind." OAS CHARTER art. 16. See A.
THOMAS &

(1972).

A.

THOMAS, THE CONCEPT oF AGGRESSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

90
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2.

United Nations Declarations and Resolutions

An examination of General Assembly proclamations since the
mid-1960s clearly indicates the international community's increasing concern over the growing use of economic and political
policies as means of coercion against other states.
The Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty'38 provides:
1..

.

. [A]rmed intervention and all other forms of interference or

attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its
political, economic and cultural elements, are condemned.
2. No state may use or encourage the use of economic, political or
any other type of measures to coerce another state in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights
or to secure from it advantages of any kind ....
9
The over-inclusive terminology, "all other forms of interference or
attempted threats," of paragraph one should be interpreted
loosely and analyzed in a broad perspective. In a world woven so
tightly by interdependence, the interchange of political and economic influence among nations is unavoidable. This interchange
of influence is both desirable and necessary to maintain open diplomatic channels and to ensure healthy, reciprocal patterns of
trade. Thus, for the first paragraph to be understood fully, permissible "influence" must be differentiated from illegal "interference." The second paragraph is designed to achieve this purpose.
Without a close reading of the second paragraph, however, the
meaning of "interference" with respect to transnational boycotts
would probably be misconstrued.
The second paragraph does not state that boycotts and other
practices of international economic coercion are illegal per se, but
instead declares that a state's motivation for a boycott must be
unequivocally ascertained to be either for the subordination of
another state's sovereign rights, or for the extraction of any advantages at the expense of the victim state. The identification of
a transnational boycott as an illicit act of economic coercion thus
depends on three factors: (1) the motive of the coercing state; (2)
the determination of when the "subordination" of the target state
138. G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.14) at 12, U.N. Doc. A/6220
(1965), reprinted in 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 662 (1966).
139. Id. at %11-2, reprinted at 663.
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occurs; and (3) whether the victim state has lost any
"advantages."
In 1970 the first and second paragraphs of the Declaration on
the Inadmissibility of Intervention were incorporated verbatim by
the General Assembly into its Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.140 This resolution, which reaffirmed the peremptory norms
for international economic behavior,"" went on to declare that
"[e]very State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any
form by another State."1 42 The overriding presumption was that
if the impact of a boycott was severe enough to interfere with a
state's right of choice, an illegal act of intervention into the domestic jurisdiction of another state would exist. 143 The obvious
difficulty lies in the determination of exactly when a transnational boycott's permissible interference ends and its intervention
begins.
Other quasi-legal statements that consider boycotts to be a
form of international economic conduct are found in General Assembly resolutions concerning permanent sovereignty over a
state's natural resources.14 4 One such declaration, adopted on December 14, 1962,' 45 emphasized "respect for the economic inde-

pendence of States' 46 in the use of resources and the import of
foreign capital.147 The use of a boycott or any other form of economic coercion that violates a nation's sovereignty over its natu140. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970), reprintedin 9 I.L.M. 1292 (1970).
141. See Rosenstock, The Declaration of the Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 713 (1971).
142. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 140, reprinted at 1295.
143. See infra notes 182-94 and accompanying text.
144. For pertinent discussion on the evolution of this notion, see generally
M. RAJAN, SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES (1978); 0. SCHACHTER, SHARING

THE WORLD'S RESOURCES

(1977); Gess, PermanentSovereignty Over Natural

Resources, 13 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 398 (1964); Hyde, Permanent Sovereignty

Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1956); O'Keefe,
The United Nations and Permanent Sovereignty Over NaturalResources, 8 J.
WORLD TRADE

L. 239 (1974). See also infra text accompanying notes 158-69.

145. G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217

(1962), reprintedin 57 AM. J. INT'L L. 710 (1963).
146. Id. at para. 15, reprinted at 710.

147. Id. at para. 2, reprinted at 711.
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ral resources would be "contrary to the spirit and principles of
the Charter of the United Nations" and an impediment to international peace and cooperation. 14 8
The doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural wealth and
resources is a matter of continuing concern in the United Nations
General Assembly, as amply demonstrated by the adoption of
similar resolutions in 1966149 and in 1973.150 The 1966 resolution
is primarily a reaffirmation of the doctrine's nature and content,
followed by an exhortation declaring that developed nations
should give accelerated developmental assistance to developing
countries. 151
In 1973 the generic concept of permanent sovereignty over natural resources became perceptibly linked to the use of boycotts as
international economic coercion. The fourth paragraph of the
1973 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources asserts that the General Assembly "[d]eplores acts of
States which use force, armed aggression, economic coercion or
any other illegal or improper means in resolving disputes concerning the exercise of sovereign rights" over natural resources. 152 The
resolution further dissuades implementation of such policies by
"[e]mphasiz[ing] the duty of all States to refrain in their international relations from military, political, economic or any other
form of coercion aimed against the territorial integrity of any
5 3
State and the exercise of its national jurisdiction.'
The passages are especially significant for two reasons. First,
they update and reinforce pronouncements made earlier in the
General Assembly's Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and its Declaration on Friendly Relations.5 4 Second, and
more important, these provisions reveal the implicit relationship
between the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the right of self-determination exhibited by the prohibition of boycotts and other practices of economic coercion. An

148.
149.
(1966),
150.
(1973),
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at para. 7, reprinted at 712.
G.A. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/6518
reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 147 (1967).
G.A. Res. 3171, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 55, U.N. Doc. A/9030
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974).
See G.A. Res. 2158, supra note 149.
G.A. Res. 3171, supra note 150, para. 4, reprinted at 239.
Id. at para. 4, reprinted at 240.
See supra note 140.
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earlier resolution, 155 promulgating the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 5 6 lends credence
to these observations. This Covenant avows that each nation has
the right to utilize and dispose of its natural resources as it sees
fit. 151 This Covenant also presumes that a boycott or any other
external economic interference that allocates or administers natural wealth would be an unlawful act of economic coercion.
A more recent United Nations statement that addressed the
impermissible use of instruments of international economic coercion is the General Assembly's Charter of Economic Rights and

Duties of States.158 Adopted in 1974, the Economic Charter de-

clared its fundamental purpose to be "the establishment of the
new international economic order, based on equity, sovereign
equality, interdependence, common interest and co-operation
among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems."" " With respect to economic coercion in general, the draft-

155. G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966), reprinted in Djonovich, United Nations Resolutions, Series 1 General
Assembly vol. 11 (1966-1968).
156. G.A. Res. 2200 Annex, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6319 (1966), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967).
157. See id. at art. 1, para. 2, reprinted at 360. The second paragraph of the
Covenant provides that:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of
international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual
benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its
own means of subsistence.
Id.
158. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974), reprinted in 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 484 (1975). The Economic Charter was
adopted on December 12, 1974, by a vote of 120 to 6 with 10 abstentions. Id.
159. G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 158, preamble, reprinted at 485. Despite its
avowed purpose, the underlying aim of this document was to impose additional
obligations upon the more developed nations in order to mobilize massive economic and technological assistance for the less developed countries. Consequently, the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties became the subject of much
heated debate, causing some legal scholars to question whether it represented a
reflection or a rejection of contemporary international law. See Brower & Tepe,
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Reflection or Rejection of InternationalLaw?, 9 INT'L LAW. 295 (1975); ef. Haight, The New InternationalEconomic Order and the Rights and Duties of States, 9 INT'L LAw. 591
(1975); Rozental, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the
New InternationalEconomic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 309 (1976); White, A New
InternationalEconomic Order?, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 322 (1976).
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ers of the Economic Charter warily avoided inserting any language that might further exacerbate the already strained political
relations between developed and developing countries. They instead opted for the status quo and adopted an abbreviated version of the same paragraph on economic coercion that had previously been incorporated into both the Declaration on the
Inadmissibility of Intervention and the Declaration on Friendly
Relations. 6 0
While the key reference to economic coercion in the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties is article 32, it is not the only such
reference. Article 1 declares that every state has the sovereign
and inalienable right to choose its own economic, political, social,
and cultural systems, free from "outside interference, coercion or
threat in any form whatsoever."1 61 Article 2 reaffirms every state's
permanent sovereignty over its "wealth, natural resources and economic activities;" 16 2 and article 5 guarantees all states the right
to form primary commodity producer organizations (i.e. cartels),
with the concomitant duty of all other states "to respect that
right by refraining from applying economic and political measures
that would limit it." ' Finally, article 16 enumerates the following "coercive policies": "colonialism, . . . neocolonialism and all
forms of foreign aggression, occupation and domination, and the
'1 64
economic and social consequence thereof.
Thus, instead of providing specific legal criteria for determining
whether or not a transnational boycott is a form of impermissible
economic coercion, the Economic Charter strengthened and safeguarded the rights of international economic development, especially as it pertained to developing countries. When placed in the
context of the entire Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, an
economically coercive boycott emerges as a national instrument
for antidevelopmentalism wielded by the developed minority
against the developing majority. The transnational boycott is depicted as a neocolonialist device for national aggrandizement un160. See supra text accompanying notes 137-39. Article 32 of the Charter of

Economic Rights and Duties provides that "[n]o State may use or encourage the
use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State

in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign
rights." G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 158, art. 32, reprinted at 493.

161. G.A. Res. 3821, supra note 158, art. 1, reprinted at 486-87.
162. Id. at art. 2, reprinted at 487.

163. Id. at art. 5, reprintedat 487-88.
164. Id. at art. 16, reprinted at 490.
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dertaken at the expense of the "have-not" countries.16 5 The provisions pertinent to economic coercion in the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties regrettably contribute little to help understand
the transnational boycott under international law.
International lawyers generally agree that resolutions of the
General Assembly are not legally binding, either upon the states
voting for them or upon the entire membership of the United Nations.16 " This is not to suggest, however, that they lack any legal
effect whatsoever.1 1 7 At the very least, these proclamations connote the world consensus on a particular subject or issue,16 8 and
some analysts believe that they may be harbingers of the direction in which international law is evolving. 169 Should this latter
contention prove to merit serious legal attention, the substantive
importance of General Assembly resolutions with respect to a
transnational boycott's economic coercion would become even

more manifest.
D.

The Transnational Boycott and General Principles of Law

In modern times, the nearly universal acceptance of general
principles of law concerning the use of force in international relations has been clearly evidenced. Accordingly, with respect to
transnational boycotts, the legal aspects of the general principles
of non-aggression, non-intervention, and self-defense are especially relevant.
165. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3821, supra note 158, arts. 13-14, 16-18, 22-26, 31-32,
reprinted at 489-93; see also Brower & Tepe, supra note 159, at 309-12; Tiewul,
The United Nations Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 10 J.
INT'L L. & ECON. 645, 676-77 (1975); Recent Development, The General Assembly's InternationalEconomics, 16 HARv. INT'L L. J. 670 (1975). One might also
infer from the Economic Charter that any denial of economic aid, technical assistance, or preferential tariff treatment to a lesser developed country is tantamount to imposing economic coercion upon that country. See Note, Charter on
Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Solution to the Development Aid
Problem?, 4 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 441 (1974).
166. For a discussion of this issue, see Joyner, U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the Contemporary Dynamics of
Norm-Creation, 11 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 445, 452-53 (1981).
167. See generally 0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1966); J. CASTAREDA,
LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS (1969); Falk, On the QuasiLegislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (1966).
168. Falk, supra note 167, at 787-90.
169. E.g., Joyner, supra note 166, at 463-64.
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1.

Non-Aggression

Devising a suitable definition for the international legal concept

of aggression has long concerned legal scholars l70 and diplo-

mats.17 1 There has been considerable debate whether the achievement of an all-inclusive definition of aggression is indeed possible, 117 2 or, for that matter, desirable. 173 The central question,
however, is whether or not the economic coercion generated by a
transnational boycott constitutes a form of aggression under current international law. The preponderance of evidence gleaned

from state practice and diplomatic negotiation suggests that it
does not. Indeed, the United Nations General Assembly's Special
Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression arrived at this
conclusion in 1974.174
The Special Committee defined aggression as "the use of armed
force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or
political independence of another State, or in any other manner

inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations."175 In order
170. See e.g., Ferencz, Defining Aggression: Where It Stands and Where It's
Going, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 491 (1972); Piper, The Legal Control of the Use of
Force and the Definition of Aggression, 2 GA. J. INT'L & CoM. L. 1 (1972);
Schwebel, Aggression, Intervention,and Self-Defence in Modern International
Law, 136 (II) RECUEM DES COURS 411 (1975); Comment, The United Nations
Definition of Aggression: A Preliminary Analysis, 5 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
171 (1975).
171. See B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR
WORLD PEACE (1975).

172. Chacko, InternationalLaw and the Concept of Aggression, 3 INDIAN J.
396 (1963); Fitzmaurice, The Definition of Aggression, 1 INTL'L & CoMP.
L. Q. 137 (1952); Comment, Why Try Again to Define Aggression?, 62 Ai i. J.
INT'L L. 701 (1968).
INT'L L.

173. J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER 74-77 (1958); Fitzmaurice,
supra note 172, at 140-43.
174. The General Assembly's directives to this Special Committee may be

found in the following: G.A. Res. 3105, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 143,
U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 2967, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 116,
U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 2781, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 137,
U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A. Res. 2644, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 126,
U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); G.A. Res. 2549, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 107,
U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969); G.A. Res. 2420, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 88,
U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968); G.A. Res. 2330, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 84,
U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
175. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M.
710, 713 (1974).
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for an action to be considered aggression under this interpretation, one state must resort to armed force against another state. 176
The omission of economic coercion from this definition implies
that armed aggression constitutes the "most serious and dangerous form of aggression," and deserves paramount emphasis.1 77 An
earlier incisive criticism of the concept of "economic aggression"
was contained in a 1952 Report of the Secretary-General on the
definition of aggression:
The concept of economic aggression appears particularly liable
to extend the concept of aggression almost indefinitely. The acts in
question not only do not involve the use of force, but are usually
carried out by a State by virtue of its sovereignty or discretionary
power. Where there are not commitments a State is free to fix its
customs tariffs and to limit or prohibit exports and imports. If it
concludes a commercial treaty with another State, superior political, economic and financial strength of course give it an advantage
over the weaker party; but that applies to every treaty, and it is
difficult to see how such inequities, which arise from differences in
situations, can be evened out short of changing the entire structure
of international society and transferring powers inherent in States
to international organs.178
The use of boycotts and other potentially deleterious international economic measures as part of a state's foreign policy is not
currently considered to be an explicit type of aggression by a consensus of United Nations members. The use of a transnational
boycott to economically coerce another state might, however, still
be construed as a "threat to" or "breach of" the peace. 79 Under
that interpretation, article 39 of the United Nations Charter
would then be applicable. This scenario brings the analysis back
176. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 175, at arts. 1-2, reprinted at 713.
177. See Ferencz, The United Nations Consensus Definition of Aggression:
Sieve or Substance?, 10 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 701 (1975); Garvey, The U.N. Definition of "Aggression": Law and Illusion in the Context of Collective Security,
17 VA. J. INT'L L. 177 (1977).
178. Study of the Definition of Aggression: Report of the Secretary-General,
7 U.N. GAOR Annexes (Agenda Item 54) at 74, U.N. Doc. A/2211 (1952). These
remarks were in reaction to a draft declaration submitted by Bolivia that would
have included as aggression any "unilateral action to deprive a State of the economic resources derived from the fair practice of international trade, or to endanger its basic economy, thus jeopardizing the security of that State." Id.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 122-34. Cf. M. McDouAL & F. FELICIANO, supra note 1, at 161-62; J. STONE, supra note 173, at 95-98.
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full circle to the uncomfortable problem of entrusting the United
Nations Security Council with an overabundance of discretionary
and interpretative power. I 0
In summary, because transnational boycotts have not been formally recognized as a type of aggression, the principle of nonaggression does not legally prohibit its use as a form of international
economic coercion. 181 This conclusion should not suggest that the
use of unrestricted economic force through boycotting is permissible under international law. On the contrary, manifold treaty
commitments, multilateral conventions, and General Assembly
resolutions have repeatedly stressed the illegality of boycotts and
censured economically coercive actions.
2. Nonintervention
It is a fundamental principle of international law that all states
have the legal duty to refrain from intervening in the affairs of
other states.1 8 2 This doctrine of nonintervention, expressed in article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter,8 3 is articulated emphatically in the General Assembly's Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention.'"
Two facets of the Declaration's treatment of the nonintervention doctrine merit attention. First, the Declaration proclaims
that "armed intervention is synonymous with aggression."185 Sec180. See supra notes 133-34.
181. This is not to say, however, that efforts in this direction have been lack-

ing. For example, in 1954 the Soviet Union formally attempted to expand the
definition of aggression to include forms of economic coercion. The Soviet draft
proposed that "economic aggression" be found to exist when a state: "(a) Takes
against another State measures of economic pressure violating its sovereignty

and economic independence and threatening the bases of its economic life; (b)
Takes against another State measures preventing it from exploiting or national-

izing its own natural riches; (c) Subjects another State to an economic blockade." Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Draft Resolution, 9 U.N. GAOR C.6

Annex (Agenda Item 51). at 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/C. 6/L.332/Rev. 1 (1954).
182. G. WISON, HANDBooK OF INTFRNATIoNAL LAW 58-65 (3d ed. 1939). See
generally R. VINCENT, NoNNMRVENTION AD INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1974).

183. "Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state .... ." U.N. CHARER art. 2, para. 7.
184. See supra note 138-39 and accompanying text [hereinafter cited as the
Declaration].

185. G.A. Res. 2131, supra note 138, at 12, reprinted at 663.
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ond, as previously discussed, 18 6 the Declaration condemns, though
not as aggression, "all other forms of interference or attempted
threats" against a state's "personality" or its political, economic,
and cultural elements. Is Although intervention may either be
armed, in which case it becomes "aggression," or unarmed, the
Declaration formally condemns both forms of intervention as
impermissible.
Additional support for the duty of nonintervention, including a
state's responsibility to curtail economically coercive transnational boycotts, may be found in other General Assembly resolutions, specifically the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, 8 '
the 1973 Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, 189 and the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties. 9 0 In addition, the Bogota Charter of 1948191 defined nonintervention so broadly that it encompassed acts which are, like
transnational boycotts, directed against the internal economy of a
state. 10 2
Clearly, the principle of nonintervention is widely accepted today. The question remains, however, whether a boycott constitutes an impermissible act of economic intervention into the internal affairs of the target state because it deprives the latter of
trade, and hence potential domestic benefits. When applied in its
primary form, the transnational boycott is clearly not an act of
intervention, because nations are free to trade with whomever
they choose. In other words, no principle exists in international
law that requires every state to have commercial relations with all
other states. 93 On the other hand, secondary and tertiary aspects
of transnational boycotts possess certain characteristics of intervention that are far more economically and politically complex,
particularly concerning the possible repercussions for the domes-

186. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
187. G.A. Res. 2131, supra note 138, at 12, reprintedat 663.
188. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 140.
189. G.A. Res. 3171, supra note 150.
190. G.A. Res. 3281, supra note 158.
191. 119 U.N.T.S. 4 (1952).
192. Id. art. 15. "No state... has the right to intervene in the internal or
external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only
armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against
the personality of the State or against its political, economic, and cultural elements." Id.
193. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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tic affairs of third-party nations.19 4
3.

Self-Defense and Retaliation

Public international law grants each state the absolute, essential rights of existence, self-preservation, and independence. 95 In
a global society marked by decentralized governmental machinery
and primitive, immature legal systems, the exercise of the basic
right of self-defense may be necessary for a state to secure maintenance of these sovereign rights. D. W. Bowett has posited that
the right of self-defense "is common to all systems of law" and is
the "fundamental" right of every state.' 9 In other words, self-defense is considered a "privilege" of self-help that has been legalized to protect the essential rights upon which the security of a
state depends. 97 Self-defense, however, must conform to an internationally accepted set of preconditions to be considered legitimate.' 9 8 Thus, economic measures otherwise considered illegal
may be justified if taken in the legitimate self-defense of a state's
national security or independence. The imposition of a transnational boycott as a means of self-defense is sanctioned as an instrument of foreign policy.' 99
Closely associated with the principle of self-defense are two
types of retaliation, reprisal and retorsion. Reprisal is a state's
nonbelligerent action taken in retaliation for what it deems to be
an illegal act committed against it by another state. An act of
reprisal is, in itself, legal, but only if made in response to another
party's illegal act. ' The international legal proposition which asserts that reprisals involving the use of armed force are illegal has
194. See infra notes 212-325 and accompanying text; see also supra text accompanying note 100.
195. G. WMSON, supra note 182, at 55-58.
196. D. Bownrr, supra note 93, at 3-4.
197. Id. at 269. See also Hindmarch, Self-Help in Time of Peace, 26 AM. J.
INT'L L. 315 (1932).
198. D. Bowyrr, supra note 93, at 269-70. For a list of these preconditions,
see supra note 94.
199. Cf. M. McDOUGAL & F. FEuLcIo, supra note 1, at 228-29.
200. Any act of reprisal raises complex legal issues and difficult problems of
interpretation and perception. For instance, accusations would probably be ex-

changed between the states as to who committed the first illegal act and who

responded with the reprisal. Indeed, uncertainty might exist over the legality of
the acts themselves. See U. WHITAKER, POLITICS AND POWER: A TEXT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

545 (1968).
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received ample support. This restriction was expressed in the
20 1
General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations,
and has been widely recognized by numerous legal scholars and
jurists. 20 2 Any limitations on the use of transnational boycotts for
reprisals, however, are conspicuously absent. Considering both
the acknowledged illegality of using armed force in reprisals and
the consistent omission of any reference to the legal status of economic reprisals, one noted authority has concluded that "[i]t is
not possible, therefore, to categorize economic reprisal as unlawful per se; on the contrary, the category is one which must be
accepted as an exception to the general prohibition of economic
coercion. ' ' 20: Notwithstanding the tenuous grounds upon which
this deduction rests, if economic coercion in the form of transnational boycotts is viewed as a legitimate means of reprisal, a boycott must rest upon the traditional preconditions for selfdefense.20 4
The second type of legal retaliation, retorsion, occurs when a
state whose citizens are being subjected to severe, though legal,
regulation or harsh treatment enacts measures of equal severity
applicable to the initial aggressor state.20 5 Acts of retorsion, or as
T. J. Lawrence labeled them, "negative reprisals," are neither violent nor directly connected with force or war.208 States often resort to acts of retorsion for political expedience and to secure redress from another state's legal, though intrusive, conduct.207 This
observation prompted George Grafton Wilson to remark, "How
far such restrictions may go is not a matter of law, but of political
policy.

'208

Although transnational boycotts may be employed le-

201. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 140. The Declaration states that: "States
have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." Id., reprinted at 1294.
202. See e.g., I. BROWNLIE, supra note 132, at 163; Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972); Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in InternationalLaw, 81 REcuEXr
DES CouRs 451, 475-94 (1952).
203. Bowett, supra note 1, at 251.
204. See supra note 94.
205. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 1183 (5th ed. 1979). See supra notes 95-97
and accompanying text.

206. T. LAWRENCE, THE PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (7th ed.
1923).
207. This argument was often marshalled to support the Arab oil embargo of
1973-74. See supra note 3.
208. G. WILSON, supra note 182, at 244.
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gaily as instruments of retorsion, such a policy would likely be
unwieldy and inefficient in securing immediate or short-term redress. 20 9 When grievances persist over a protracted period of time,
however, it seems more feasible to consider transnational boycotts
2 10
as a method of retorsion.
E.

Summation and Evaluation

An economically coercive transnational boycott is not specifically prohibited by the principle of nonaggression because it has
not been interpreted as an illegal action or as an act of aggression.
A transnational boycott could violate the legal principle of nonintervention only if the boycotting state's motive was the unmitigated contravention of another state's sovereignty, territorial integrity, or political independence.
The use of transnational boycotts as economically coercive
measures appears fully justified by international law as a means
of legitimate self-defense. Though not clearly sanctioned, a transnational boycott may be used as a form of reprisal as long as it
does not violate the principles of nonaggression and nonintervention. The use of transnational boycotts for the purpose of retorsion, however, has been established and recognized as a legitimate
practice under international law. Of all the rationales presented
for imposing economically coercive boycotts, retorsion may be the
most convenient and legally defensible in current international
politics.
Restraints on the use of boycotts as instruments of national
foreign policy have been formally incorporated into a multitude
of bilateral and multilateral international treaties. Under provisions of the United Nations Charter, the concept of the transnational boycott as a form of economic coercion is constrained by
strict interpretation. The inexact language of the U.N. Charter
tends to obscure the precise conceptual relevance of economic coercion, particularly as applied to boycotts. Because economic coercion is not interpreted legally as aggression, "force," or "armed
force," it is immune from the self-defense provision of article 51.
209. More efficient acts of retorsion include raising national tariffs, suspending payments due a state, and imposing cumbersome travel or diplomatic
restrictions on a state's nationals until adequate redress is made. Id.; T. LAWRENc E, supra note 206, at 312; U. WHITAKER, supra note 200, at 545.
210. Consider, for example, the Arab League's boycott against Israel. See N.
JOYNER, supra note 42, at 278-84.
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Furthermore, the intrinsic definitional characteristics of economic
coercion are so multifaceted and susceptible to diverse interpretation that any potential consideration of what economic actions
might constitute a "threat to or breach of the peace" pursuant to
article 37 would open a Pandora's box of political and legal difficulties. Through formal resolutions and recommendations, the
United Nations General Assembly has repeatedly called for the
condemnation of transnational boycotts and other acts of international economic coercion that interfere with the sovereign rights
of other states. Although these documents are not legally binding,
they do represent an apparent consensus of member nations.
This Article has appraised the permissible parameters within
which transnational boycotts exist under international law. When
states attempt to extend their jurisdictional purview extraterritorially, they implicitly invite tension or conflict with other states.
The growing awareness of international economic coercion during
the mid-1970s, largely a result of the influence of the Arab boycott against Israel, prompted a great deal of governmental concern and policy debate about transnational boycotts. Indeed, a
number of Western states proposed specific domestic countermeasures for dealing with the adverse repercussions from transnational boycotts. Significantly, the legislative responses adopted
by these states pose salient questions about the international legality of transnational boycotts.211 These queries merit special attention in order to appreciate the current practice and legal status of transnational boycotts as policy instruments of economic
coercion.
V. THE TRANSNATIONAL BoycoTT IN MUNICIPAL LAW

A.

General Observations

National economic policies may be compatible with the free
flow of commerce between nations or they may operate to restrict
or suppress that flow. With respect to transnational boycotts,
even though an instigating state's main objectives may initially
211. For example, does current municipal legislation serve to impugn or rebuke the lawfulness of primary transnational boycotts? What legal implications
have devolved from the extraterritorial reach of antiboycott laws, and what special relevance does such municipal legislation hold for international law regarding transnational boycotts? Do such antiboycott statutes gainsay the right of a
state, or a group of states, to impose transnational boycotts that have multiple
levels of coercive reach?
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appear to be political and economic, commercial repercussions
may nonetheless be felt in nontargeted sectors of the international community.
Primary transnational boycotts normally do not directly affect
the domestic economies of third-party states. Secondary and tertiary levels of transnational boycotts, however, tend to have a
more sweeping economic impact2 12 and may produce more serious
commercial ramifications for third-party states and pose serious
conflicts for sovereign prerogatives, national interests, and extraterritorial jurisdiction.2 13 Traditionally, the reaction of nontargeted third-party states to transnational boycotts has been one
of indifference, primarily because of the boycott's muted economic effects and other considerations of overriding national interest.2 14 More recently, however, the heightened political salience
of the Arab League's boycott against Israel, 15 and its pervasive
repercussions on international commerce, 2 6 have generated special legislation against boycotts in the United States and other
Western nations.2 17
B.

The United States

United States legislative attention to transnational boycott-related activities dates back to the Export Control Act of 1949.218
Under this statute, Congress authorized the President to regulate
exports from the United States, its territories, and its possessions,
for purposes of national security, foreign policy, or supply
shortages. In 1965 Congress amended this legislative policy pro212. See Comment, The Arab Boycott: A Legislative Solution to a Multi-

DimensionalProblem, 39 U. PiTT. L. REv. 63, 67 (1977).
213. See Marcuss, The Antiboycott Law: The Regulation of International
Business Behavior, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 559, 561-63 (1978).
214. See, e.g., The Arab Boycott and American Business, supra note 48, at

viii-xii. This has also been the contemporary attitude espoused by several Western European governments regarding the Arab boycott against Israel. See gener-

ally Turck, A ComparativeStudy of Non-United States Responses to the Arab
Boycott, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 711 (1978); Phillips, supra note 49, at 41-91.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 32-49.
216. See generally The Arab Boycott and American Business, supra note
48; DiscriminatoryArab Pressure on U.S. Business Hearings, supra note 48, at
115.
217. Paradoxically, the United States is an active practitioner of transnational economic coercion, both during peacetime crises and during times of national emergency. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
218. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1949) (expired 1969).
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nouncement.219 It became United States policy:
(A) to oppose restrictive trade practices or boycotts fostered or
imposed by foreign countries against other countries friendly to the.
United States and (B) to encourage and request domestic concerns
engaged in the export of articles, materials, supplies, or information, to refuse to take any action, including the furnishing of information or the signing of agreements, which has the effect of furthering or supporting the restrictive trade practices or boycotts
fostered or imposed by any foreign
country against another coun220
try friendly to the United States.
Because the initial antiboycott law was enforced only by rudimentary reporting requirements,221 it served as little more than a
United States policy declaration. In the Export Administration
Act of 1969,222 Congress reiterated both this general policy proclamation and its reporting requirements.223 Within a year, the President transferred his delegated authority over boycotts to the Sec224
retary of Commerce.

Following a period of protracted controversy 2 25 and heightened
sensitivity 226 regarding United States business involvement in,
219. Act of June 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 3, 79 Stat. 209, 210 (1965),
(amending 50 U.S.C. app. § 2022 (1949)) (current version at 50 U.S.C. app. §
2402 (5)) (1982).
220. Id.
221. For implementation, Congress provided the following:
Such rules and regulations shall implement the provisions of section 2(4)
of this Act and shall require that all domestic concerns receiving requests
for the furnishing of information or the signing of agreements as specified
in section 2(4) must report this fact to the Secretary of Commerce for.such
action as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of section
2(4).
Act of June 30, 1965, supra note 219, § 4(d).
222. Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969) (current
version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1982)).
223. Id.
224. Exec. Order No. 11,533, 35 Fed. Reg. 8,799 (1970), reprinted in 50
U.S.C.A. app. § 2403, at 12,580 (1970) revoked by Exec. Order No. 12,002, 42
Fed. Reg. 35,623 (1976), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. app. § 2403, at 495.
225. See, e.g., The Arab Boycott and American Business, supra note 48, at
29; The SpreadingBoycott Brouhaha, TmE, Nov. 8, 1976, at 93.
226. See, e.g., Discriminatory Arab Pressure on U.S. Business Hearings,
supra note 48, at 2-10 (statement of Henry A. Waxman, United States Representative from the twenty-fourth District of California); D. CHILI, THE ARAB
BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL: ECONoMIc AGGRESSION AND WORLD REACTION (1976); Turck,
The Arab Boycott of Israel, 55 Foreign Aff. 472, 479 (1977); Backlash at the
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and compliance with, Arab boycott demands during the mid1970s, 227 Congress enacted the 1977 Amendments to the Export
Administration Act of 1969.228 The 1977 Amendments were sub-

sequently incorporated verbatim into the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (EAA), 22 9 and represents the most comprehensive for-

eign boycott regulatory scheme adopted by any national government to date.
The 1977 Amendments pertain solely to certain specified acts
performed intentionally30 by "United States persons '2 1 engaged
Boycott, TIME, Mar. 10, 1975, at 39.
227. See generally The Arab Boycott and American Business, supra note
48; Discriminatory Arab Pressure on U.S. Business Hearings, supra note 48;
AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS,

supra note 37.

228. Act of June 22, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235 (1977) (current
version at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1982)). The literature on the 1977
Amendments is extensive. See, e.g., A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
LAW: TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL EnDs (1977); Friedman, Confronting the
Arab Boycott: A Lawyer's Baedeker, 19 HARv.INT'L L. J. 443 (1978); Ludwig &
Smith, supra note 35; Marcuss, The Antiboycott Law: The Regulation of InternationalBusiness Behavior, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 559 (1978); Steiner, Pressures and Principles-The Politics of the Antiboycott Legislation, 8 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMp. L. 529 (1978); Tate & Lake, Taking Sides: An Overview of the
U.S. Legislative Response to the Arab Boycott of Israel, 6 DEN. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 613 (1977); Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Export Administrative Amendments of 1977, 8 GA. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 741 (1978); Note, Analysis
and Application of the Anti-Boycott Provisions of the Export Administration
Amendments of 1977, 9 LAW & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 915 (1977); Note, The Development, Scope and Application of the New Antiboycott Law of the United
States, 10 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 397 (1977).
229. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982).
230. The regulations provide:
Actions will be deemed to be taken with intent to comply with an unsanctioned foreign boycott if the person taking such action knew that such
action was required or requested for boycott reasons. On the other hand,
the mere absence of a business relationship with a blacklisted person or
with or in a boycotted country does not indicate the existence of the requisite intent.
15 C.F.R. § 369.1(e)(6) (1984).
231. A "United States person" is defined as any "person who is a United
States resident or national, including individuals, domestic concerns, and controlled in fact foreign subsidiaries, affiliates, or other permanent foreign establishments of domestic concerns." 15 C.F.R. § 369.1(b). "Controlled in fact" indicates that determination of control over a foreign subsidiary is not predicated
solely on a proportion of equity ownership in the foreign subsidiary. Rather, it
will also depend on the authority or ability of the "domestic concern" to set
general policies or control daily operations of the foreign subsidiary. Id. §
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in either interstate or foreign commerce of the United States.23 2
The EAA prohibits "taking or knowingly agreeing.. . to comply
with, further, or support any boycott fostered or imposed by a
foreign country against a country which is friendly to the United
States and which is not itself the object of any form of boycott
pursuant to United States law or regulation.

'233

The Act forbids

persons under its jurisdiction from refusing to do business with,
or in, a boycotted state if that refusal is based upon a requirement or request from, or on behalf of, a boycotting government. 234
The Act also outlaws boycott-related discrimination against
United States persons on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin; 235 as well as the furnishing, for reasons related to a
boycott, of any information pertaining to race, religion, sex, or national origin of any United States person, or any owner, officer,
director, or employee of such person.236 Persons within the Act's
jurisdiction are prohibited from supplying information concerning
business relationships with boycotted countries or blacklisted persons 237 and communicating information about supporters of charitable or fraternal organizations that support a boycotted country. 238 In addition, United States persons are legally precluded

from "paying, honoring, confirming, or otherwise implementing"
letters of credit which contain any condition or compliance requirements forbidden by the regulation.23 9
The effect of the 1977 Amendments has some important international legal implications. First, nothing contained in the provisions purports to encroach upon the sovereign right of foreign
states to conduct primary boycott operations against other states;
the statute clearly applies only to United States persons. Second,
the prohibitions obviously are aimed directly at a transnational
boycott's secondary and tertiary levels, rather than at its primary
369.1(c).
232. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1).
233. Id.
234. Id. § 2407(a)(1)(A).
235. Id. § 2407(a)(1)(B).
236. Id. § 2407(a)(1)(C).
237. Id. § 2407(a)(1)(D). This provision deals directly with information questionnaires that must be submitted by companies who wish to do business with
certain governments in the Middle East. See supra note 78.
238. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(E).
239. Id. § 2407(a)(1)(F).

19841

TRANSNATIONAL BOYCOTTS

level. 24 0 A United States person cannot refuse to deal with a busi-

ness concern in a boycotted state at the request of the boycotting
government, nor can he refuse to deal with another United States
person for boycott-related reasons.241 United States persons, however, are permitted by exceptions enumerated in the Act 2 42 to

comply or agree to comply with (1) requirements forbidding importation of goods or services from a targeted state;243 (2) prohibitions against shipping goods on a carrier belonging to a targeted
state;244 or (3) route stipulations prescribed by the boycotting
government.2 45 The statute serves to preserve the integrity of a

primary boycott, but circumscribes the use of secondary
and ter24 6
tiary boycotts as instruments of national policy.

240.

See Kestenbaum, The Arab Boycott in U.S. Law: Flawed Remedies for

an International Trade Restraint, 10 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 769, 781-82;
Lahoud, Federaland New York State Anti-Boycott Legislation: The Preemption Issue, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 371, 385 (1982).
During the 1977 House debates on the extension of the Export Administration
Act of 1969, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance made it clear that the Carter
Administration considered instigation of transnational boycotts at the primary
level to be a legitimate sovereign right:
We are strongly opposed to foreign boycotts directed against friendly
countries. But we understand that states do exercise their sovereign rights
to regulate their commerce, and to decide, if they wish, to refuse to deal
with other nations or the firms of other nations. They have the right to
control the source of their imports as well as the destination of their
exports.
We view as a different matter, however, efforts by any foreign countries
to influence decisions and activities of American firms in connection with
any primary boycott of another country. Thus, secondary boycott practices
of other countries can intrude seriously into the business practices of
American firms engaged in U.S. commerce and can have the effect of using
U.S. commerce to harm third countries with whom we are friends. I believe we will all agree that U.S. firms should not be required, by the decision of a foreign nation, to avoid commercial relations with other friendly
countries or with other U.S. firms.
Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969: Hearings and Markup
Before the House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1977).
241. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2407(a)(1)(A) (1982).
242. Id. § 2407(a)(2)(A)-(F).
243. Id. § 2407(a)(2)(A).
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Kestenbaum, supra note 240, at 809-11; Marcuss, supra note 228, at
561.
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Other explicit exceptions set out in the 1977 Amendments underscore the United States concomitant concerns over national
sovereign prerogatives, international comity considerations, and
potential extraterritorial jurisdictional conflicts. The statute allows United States persons to comply with a boycotting state's
import and shipping documentation requirements by providing
information regarding the country of origin, name of the carrier,
route of the shipment, and name of the suppliers.24 7 The Act permits compliance or agreements to comply with the boycotting
state's practice of unilateral and specific selection of goods and
services. This includes the selection of carriers, insurers, and suppliers of services to be performed within the boycotting state or of
specific goods which, in "the normal course of business," are identifiable by source when imported into that state.24 8 A United
States person may not only comply or agree to comply with export requirements of a boycotting state regarding shipments and
transshipments of exports to the target state, or to any business
concern or resident located there,2 49 but also may comply with the
immigration or passport requirements of a boycotting state
affecting the person or members of the person's family, or with information requests that are required for the person's employment
within the boycotting state.2 50 A further exception permits United
States persons who are bona fide residents of a boycotting state to
comply with that state's laws regarding activities exclusively
within the state. 2 1 Finally, compliance with a boycotting state's
import laws is permitted when those laws pertain to the importation of any trademarked, tradenamed, or other "specifically identifiable products, or components . . . for . . . [the United States
person's] own use."' 51
The 1977 Amendments, as currently embodied in the EAA, represent a qualified attempt by the United States to maintain sovereign authority over its interstate and international commerce.
On one hand, the Act works to deter United States corporations
from complying with secondary and tertiary levels of foreign boy247. 50 U.S.C. § 2407(a)(2)(B). Information may not be knowingly furnished
or conveyed in response to these requirements in negative replies, blacklisting,

or other similar exclusionary terms. Id.
248. Id. § 2407(a)(2)(C).
249. Id. § 2407(a)(2)(D).
250. Id. § 2407(a)(2)(E).
251. Id. § 2407(a)(2)(F).
252. Id.
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cotts. On the other hand, the regulation considers a qualified
compliance with primary boycotts to be an exercise of inherent
national sovereignty. 25 Though deferential to some particular foreign states' interests, 2 " these regulations nevertheless accommo253. See 15 C.F.R. pt. 369 (1984). Resolution of the inherent jurisdictional
conflicts posed by extraterritorial legislative measures taken against foreign
transnational boycotts may be considered in terms of international comity. In
this regard, the appropriate doctrine has been authoritatively set out as follows:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law
and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the
part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider, in
good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the
light of such factors as;
(a) vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person,
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state,
(d) the nationality of the person, and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that
state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 40

(1965). It should be emphasized that the United States Government considers
primary boycotts to be legitimate exercises of sovereignty, even when applied as
premeditated measures of "economic warfare." An official congressional report
noted:
The Arab boycott is not entirely unique in relations among sovereign
states. The practice of one state boycotting another is one of a number of
traditional techniques of exerting economic pressure to achieve desired,
mostly political ends.. .. Techniques of economic warfare... are generally considered to be legitimate exercises of sovereignty, not contrary to
international law.
The Arab Boycott and American Business, supra note 48, at 9 (footnotes
omitted).
254. In this connection, one commentator has opined that:
The U.S. response represents more than a necessarily flexible balancing
of its own interests with those of the Arab states. Although a goal of the
EAA is to enhance U.S. sovereignty, the United States has permitted impairment of its sovereignty by failing to enact stricter legislation against
compliance with the Arabs' extraterritorial imposition of the secondary
and tertiary boycotts. It has compromised its interest in exercising jurisdiction over its internal trade in favor of supposedly more pressing national interests, i.e., maintaining a steady flow of petrodollars into the
United States, avoiding interruption of U.S. commercial operations in
Arab countries and continuing U.S. diplomatic efforts toward a resolution
of the Middle East conflict. The EAA is exceedingly deferential to the ju-
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date United States national interests in broader international legal norms that affect extraterritorial sovereign jurisdiction and
human rights considerations.
Although the 1977 Amendments remain paramount among
United States antiboycott legislation, other United States laws
contain provisions relevant to the regulation of foreign boycotts.
Under the Ribicoff Amendments to the Tax Reform Act of
1976,255 participation in, or cooperation with, an international
boycott could result in substantial tax losses on income derived
from such participation. 28 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
risdictional conflicts created by the anti-boycott legislation. Its broad exceptions, misplaced priorities and restrictive jurisdiction in effect permit
compliance with the boycott to a degree beyond that prescribed by international comity, i.e., good faith concessions to limitations of sovereignty
and territorial jurisdiction. The excessive compromise by Congress is illustrated by the weighted consideration of both Arab and U.S. interests ....
Lahoud, supra note 240, at 384 (footnotes omitted).
255. I.R.C. § 999(a) (1982).
256. While participation in foreign boycotts was not specifically outlawed by
this provision, a taxpayer or its shareholder could lose certain of the following
tax benefits: the foreign tax credit under I.R.C. § 908(a); the shareholder's circumscribed inclusion of a controlled foreign corporation's income under §
952(a)(3); and the tax deferral associated with owners of Domestic International
Sales Corporations (DISCs) under 995(b)(1)(F). For elaboration, see I.R.C. §
999(b)-(c).
The Internal Revenue Code defines participation in, or cooperation with, an
international boycott to include any agreement:
(A) (i) to refrain from doing business with or in a country which is the
object of the boycott or with the government, companies, or nationals of
that country;
(ii) to refrain from doing business with any United States person engaged in trade in a country which is the object of the boycott or with the
government, companies, or nationals of that country;
(iii) to refrain from doing business with any company whose ownership
or management is made up, all or in part, of individuals of a particular
nationality, race or religion, or to remove (or refrain from selecting) corporate directors who are individuals of a particular nationality, race, or religion; or
(iv) to refrain from employing individuals of a particular nationality,
race, or religion; or
(B) as a condition of the sale of a product to a government, a company, or
a national of a country, to refrain from shipping or insuring that product
on a carrier owned, leased or operated by a person who does not participate in or cooperate with an international boycott (within the meaning of
subparagraph (A)).
I.R.C. § 999(b)(3). See Treasury Boycott Guidelines H-M, 43 Fed. Reg. 3,454,
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is also applicable in situations involving possible employment discrimination from boycott-related personnel policies.2 58
Transnational boycotts also raise significant implications for
United States antitrust laws 25 9 and the Securities and Exchange
1964257

3,462-68 (1978); Rubenfeld, Legal and Tax Implications of Participatingin InternationalBoycotts, 32 TAx L. REv. 613 (1977).
257. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000-17 (1982). Title VII states that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-to fail or
refuse to hire or to (1) discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin ..
Id. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1).
258. If a United States business were to modify its personnel policies in order to comply with pressures emanating from a foreign government's transnational boycott, and the business failed to employ or promote individuals of a
particular religious or ethnic group in order to gain market access to the boycotting state, it is very likely that the employer would be in violation of Title
VII. See Comment, The Arab Boycott and Title VII, 12 Hv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
181 (1977). ,
259. If goods or services are contracted out by a foreign boycotting state to a
United States supplier on the condition that a blacklisted subcontractor not be
used in the transaction, the United States supplier may refuse to deal with the
otherwise qualified corporate subcontractor. In such an instance, the critical factor is whether compliance with the request constitutes a concerted "contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy" within the parameters of section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
In United States v. Bechtel Corp., the Justice Department alleged that Bechtel Corporation and its affiliates, as principal contractors on major construction
projects in Arab countries, "entered into and implemented in the United States
a combination and conspiracy which resulted in an unreasonable restraint of
...interstate and foreign trade and commerce in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act," by refusing to deal with persons blacklisted by Arab boycott organizations. Complaint, pt. VII, 1 20-21, United States v. Bechtel Corp., No. C76-99 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1976), reprinted in [Jan.-June] ANTTUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 747, at D-1, D-2 (Jan. 20, 1976).
In January 1977 the Department of Justice and Bechtel Corporation agreed
on a consent decree enjoining Bechtel from pursuing actions within the United
States that would result in the boycott of blacklisted subcontractors, but allowing Bechtel to use certain specified subcontractors as long as the selection
had been made unilaterally by the client Arab government or a company engaging Bechtel. Proposed Final Judgment, No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1976),

reprinted in [Jan.-June]

ANTITRUST

&

TRADE REG.

REP. (BNA) No. 796, at E-1

(Jan. 11, 1977) and in 42 Fed. Reg. 3,716 (1977); Competitive Impact Statement,
No. C-76-99 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 1976), reprinted in [Jan.-June] ANTTRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 796, at E-4 (Jan. 11, 1977) and in 42 Fed. Reg.
3,718 (1977). For analyses detailing the specific antitrust issues in question, see
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Commission's disclosure statutes.260 In addition, since 1975, several state governments in the United States2 61 have directly responded to the various pressures from foreign boycotts 262 by pass-

ing their own explicit antiboycott legislation. 263

Baker, Antitrust Remedies Against Government-InspiredBoycotts, Shortages,
and Squeezes: Wandering on the Road to Mecca, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 911
(1976); Johnstone & Paugh, The Arab Boycott of Israel: The Role of United
States Antitrust Laws in the Wake of the Export Administration Amendments
of 1977, 8 GA. J. INT'L. & CozP. L. 661 (1978); Kestenbaum, The Antitrust Challenge to the Arab Boycott: Per Se Theory, Middle East Politics, and United
States v. Bechtel Corporation,54 TEx. L. REV. 1411 (1976); Schwartz, The Arab
Boycott and American Responses: Antitrust Law or Executive Discretion, 54
TEX. L. REV. 1260 (1976); Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boycotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEx. L. REV. 1
(1976); Note, The Antitrust Implications of the Arab Boycott, 74 MICH. L. REV.
795 (1976).
260. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982).
261. Between 1975 and 1978, at least thirteen states passed legislation specifically designed to protect their residents from boycott-related trade restrictions
and discriminatory practices. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 16721, 16721.5,
16721.6 (West Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 42-125a to 42-125n (West
Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 542.34 (West Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 29,
§§ 91-96 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-101 to 11115 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151E (West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN., §
325D.53 (West 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-3, :5-5, :5-12, :5-17 (West Supp.
1984); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 296, 298-a (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1984); N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 75B-1 to 75B-7 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1129.11, 1153.05,
1331.01-1331.11 (Page 1979 & Supp. 1984); ORE. REv. STAT. § 30.860 (1983);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (Supp. 1979).
262. Legal justification for these state statutes rests upon two broad concepts. The first is a state's legitimate interest in preventing its citizens and residents from being discriminated against on grounds of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. Cf. supra note 257. The second justification is based on the antitrust notions of illegal conspiracies or combinations that have affected commerce
within a state. At least twelve states have legislated private rights of action for
parties injured by violation of their state antiboycott laws. See CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 16750 (West Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-125i (West
Supp. 1984); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 60-7(2) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984); AM.
COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-109(b)(2) (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151E, § 3
(West 1982); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.57 (West 1981); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-13
(West Supp. 1984); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 297 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1984); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 75B-4 (1981); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 1331.08 (Page 1979); ORE.
REV. STAT. § 30.860(2) (1983); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030(2) (Supp.

1984).
263. See supra note 261. For example, New York's Human Rights Law is
directed at intrastate rather than foreign commerce, and provides that:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice (i) for any person to dis-
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Since 1975 the United States has consciously endeavored to
adopt a less permissive policy toward foreign imposed boycotts.
This redirection in United States commercial law occurred in response to the negative spillover effects produced by the secondary
and tertiary levels of the Arab boycott against Israel. Nevertheless, the applicability of United States antiboycott provisions to
criminate against, boycott or blacklist, or to refuse to buy from, sell to or
trade with, any person, because of the race, creed, color, national origin or
sex of such person, or of such person's partners, members, stockholders,
directors, officers, managers, superintendents, agents, employees, business
associates, suppliers or customers, or (ii) for any person wilfully to do any
act or refrain from doing any act which enables any such person to take
such action.
N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296(13) (McKinney 1982).
Significantly, the New York Executive Law extends its jurisdiction extraterritorially to encompass targets abroad.
1. The provisions of this article shall apply as hereinafter provided to an
act committed outside this state against a resident of this state or against
a corporation organized under the laws of this state or authorized to do
business in this state, if such act would constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice if committed within this state.
2. If a resident person or domestic corporation violates any provision
of this article by virtue of the provisions of this section, this article shall
apply to such person or corporation in the same manner and to the same
extent as such provisions would have applied had such act been committed
within this state except that the penal provisions of such article shall not
be applicable.
3. If a non-resident person or foreign corporation violates any provision of this article by virtue of the provisions of this section, such person
or corporation shall be prohibited from transacting any business within
this state.. . . If the division of human rights has reason to believe that a
non-resident person or foreign corporation has committed or is about to
commit outside of this state an act which if committed within this state
would constitute an unlawful discriminatory practice and that such act is
in violation of any provision of this article by virtue of the provisions of
this section,. . . [it may issue] an order prohibiting such person or corporation from transacting any business within this state.
Id. at § 298-a. For appropriate analytical commentary on the antiboycott legislation of various states, see Feinerman, The Arab Boycott and State Law: The
New York Anti-Boycott Statute, 18 HARv. INT'L L. J. 343 (1977); Hirschhorn &
Fenton, States' Rights and the Antiboycott Provisions of the Export Administration Act, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 517 (1981); Lahoud, supra note 240;
Note, State Reaction to the Arab Boycott of Israel: Legislative and Constitutional Preemption, 57 B.U.L. REv. 335 (1977); Note, The Constitutionalityof
New York's Response to the Arab Boycott, 28 SYRACUSE L. R.v. 631 (1977);
Note, State Legislative Responses to the Arab Boycott of Israel, 10 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 592 (1977).
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any extraterritorial boycott that falls within United States jurisdiction, as well as the legal consequences that flow from that justiciability, cannot be denied.
C. France
France was the first European state to adopt antiboycott legislation. The initial attempts to pass such a law occurred in the
1976 debates of the National Assembly and in legal propositions
submitted to the French Senate.2 ' On June 7, 1977, after wrangling over semantic connotations,26" the Parliament unanimously
added new articles to the French Penal Code that, in effect, constituted antiboycott legislation. The French statute curtailing
participation in transnational economic boycotts, article 187-2,
provides:
I.... Art. 187-2... [P]enalties... are equally applicable to all
civil servants or any government appointee who, by their action or
omission, would have contributed to making more difficult the normal exercise of economic activities:
1. By all natural persons because of their national origin, or because of their belonging or not belonging, real or supposed, to a
particular ethnic group, race or religion.
2. By any corporate entity because of the national origin, racial,
religious or ethnic affiliation of all or some of its members or
directors.
II .... Art. 416-1... [Plenalties ... are also applicable to any

person who, by his action or omission, and without legitimate reason, would have contributed to making more difficult the normal
exercise of economic activities:
1. By all natural persons because of their national origin, or because of their belonging or not belonging, real or supposed, to a
particular ethnic group, race or religion.
2. By any corporate entity because of the national origin, racial,
264. See Senat. Rapport No. 235 (France) 59-60 (1976); Senat. Rapport No.
241 (France) (1976).
265. Much of the debate centered around the propriety of including the
phrase "belonging to a nation" (i.e. nationality), as a prohibited basis for boycotting. The final version adopted the words "belonging to a [particular] national origin [origine nationale]." See Assembl6e Nationale, lere Seance du 30
novembre 1976, at 8806-07; Assembl~e Nationale, lere Seance du 3 mai 1977, at
2370-72; Assemblhe Nationale, Seconde Session Ordinaire de 1976-1977. Rapport No. 2925 fait au Nom de law Commission Miste partaire, 26 mai 1977, at 910; Assembl6e Nationale, lere Seance du 2 juin 1977, at 1130j; Turck, supra note
214, at 726-31.
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religious or ethnic affiliation of all or some of its members.
HI. The provisions of articles 187-2 and 416-1 of the penal code do
not apply when the acts described in these articles conform to directives issued within the framework of the government's economic
and commercial
policies or in applications of its international
268
obligations.

While the statute is vague in scope and relatively undefined in
application, the impetus for its promulgation clearly stemmed

from the Parliament's desire to preclude French firms from actively complying with the discriminatory facets26 7 of the Arab

boycott against Israel. 55 Interestingly enough, the statute was legally usurped soon after its enactment for precisely that reason.

Within a month after enactment of the antiboycott law,
Campagnie Francaised'Assurance pour le Commerce Exterieur
(COFACE), France's state-controlled and largest insurance com-

pany, refused to provide any further financial guarantees on contracts made by French businesses exporting to Middle East Arab

states. 269 This policy was purportedly adopted by COFACE be-

cause the French Government had failed to provide explicit
guidelines on how the agency should perform under the new an-

tiboycott legislation. 27 0 Faced with this situation, on July 24,
1977, Prime Minister Raymond Barr6 issued an avis, or advisory

opinion,27 1 that essentially stripped the French antiboycott statute of any practical effect upon the overseas exporting and contractual activities of COFACE and French firms.27 This action by
266. Loi no. 77-574 du 7 juin, 1977, 1977 Journal Officiel de la R6publique
Frangaise [J.O.] 3151, 3154, 1977 Dalloz-Sirey, Legislation [D.S.L.] 219, 221-22
(author's unofficial translation).
267. The practice of issuing negative certificates of origin and the presumed
scrutiny of the religious and ethnic affiliations of corporate directors to determine contractual recipients were particularly odious. See Assembl~e Nationale,
27 Novembre 1976, D.D.O.F. (no. 2148-1634).
268. Phillips, supra note 49, at 15; Le Monde, Feb. 7, 1978, at 26, col. 1.
269.

MIDDLE E. ECON. DIG., July 1, 1977, at 6; MIDDLE E. ECON.

DIG.,

June

24, 1977, at 10.
270.

MIDDLE

E. ECON. DIG., July 1, 1977, at 6.

271. Avis du 24 juillet, 1977, 1977 J.O. 2360.
272. The avis averred:
Because of the need to reestablish a balance in foreign trade and to alleviate the employment situation in France by searching for new markets,
the development of French exports is an objective that has higher priority
than ever.
This line is consistent with the guidelines of the law of July 21, 1976
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the French Government effectively nullified the caveat provided
in paragraph III of the antiboycott legislation.273 French commercial initiatives in the markets of both oil-producing states and
lesser developed countries were, thus, deemed a "higher priority"
than what the new antiboycott legislation would have permitted.
As a result, from 1977 through 1981, the French antiboycott law
remained moribund, but certainly not forgotten.274
The vitality of article 187-2 was apparently resuscitated after
the 1981 election of Francois Mitterand as President of France. In
July 1981 the Mitterand Government reportedly reinstated the
antiboycott statute. 5 The status of the law is currently uncertain, ill-publicized, and somewhat polemic. In short, it is too early
to assess the law's efficacy in relation to French trade. Since its
inception, the French antiboycott legislation clearly has been
aimed directly at the elimination of religious, racial, and ethnic
discrimination in transnational commerce. At the very least, the
approving Plan VII of Economic and Social Development, which provides
that it is appropriate "to promote penetration by exporting countries and
countries in the process of industrialization in the Mid-East, Southeast
Asia, Latin America and certain countries of Africa." The rapid development of exports towards these markets is a fundamental goal of the economic and commercial policy of the Government.
It is therefore specified, in application of Paragraph HI of Article 32 of
Law No. 77-574 of June 7, 1977, that commercial operations performed for
these markets enter within the framework of the economic and commercial
Governpolicy of the Government and are therefore in agreement with
ment directives. In particular, it therefore follows that Paragraphs I and II
of Article 32 mentioned above are not applicable to decisions granting
COFACE guarantees with regard to contracts relating to the aforesaid
commercial operations.
Id. (author's unofficial translation).
273. See supra text accompanying note 266.
274. In October 1977 a challenge to the Prime Minister's avis was filed by
the Movement for the Liberty of Commerce (MLC) with the Conseil d'Etat,the
court having jurisdiction over French government officials. AMmRCAN JEWISH
CONGRESS, 6 BOYCOTT REPORT: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS AFFECTING THE ARAB
BoYcoTT 5 (1977). See also Phillips, supra note 49, at 42. A complaint was also
initiated by the MLC before the European Economic Community (EEC) Commission accusing COFACE of violating article 86 of the Treaty of Rome, March
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, the abuse of dominant position provision. The EEC
Commission decided that COFACE was not in violation of any of the Treaty of
Rome's provisions, and the MLC dropped the case in late 1977. Id. at 43.
275. Mitterand Reinstates French Anti-Boycott Law, BOYCOTT L. BuLL.,
July 1981, at 1-2; see also French Government Moves Against Arab Boycott,
BoYcoTT L. BULL., Aug. 1981, at 6.
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French antiboycott law experience underscores the international
community's disdain for multitiered transnational boycotts, particularly those rooted in discriminatory practices that violate fundamental norms of international human rights.2 76
D.

Canada

Canada has no formal federal legislation requiring noncompliance with transnational boycotts. The Canadian Government,
nevertheless, has enacted a program designed to curtail possible
support for boycott-related activities within its own institutional
structure. This official antiboycott policy program was synthesized from a set of policy options first enumerated in a secret
Cabinet memorandum concerning the Arab boycott against
Israel. 7 7 As enunciated during the House of Commons debates of
October 1976, the Canadian Government's policy was based upon
the following positions:
(1) Prohibition of Canadian firms from adhering to boycotts imposed by foreign countries against third countries;
(2) Denial of Canadian Government support to any project requiring Canadians to comply with a foreign country's boycott of a
third country and the requirement that Canadian firms report boycott-related requests to the Government;
(3) Denial of Canadian Government support to projects requiring
compliance with the boycott, condemnation of boycotts and the requirement that Canadian firms report boycott-related requests
which discriminate against Canadian companies or citizens on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; and
(4) Forbidding government support of contracts containing provisions discriminating on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic group
and the issuance of a government statement reaffirming Canada's
(a) opposition to discrimination, (b) policy of trading in peaceful
goods with all nations, and (c) view that private firms have the
responsibility to choose their own trading partners and contract
terms.2 7 8

276. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts.
1-2, 7, 13, 15, 23, 28, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 135 (1948).
277. Toronto Globe and Mail, Aug. 6, 1976, reprinted in S. HADAwi, ARAB
Boycorr OF ISRAEL:

PEACEFUL DEFENSIVE AND CONSTRucTIvE

10 (1977).

278. Toronto Globe and Mail, supra note 277, reprinted at 10-12. See Commons Debates, Oct. 21, 1976, at 302 (statement of Donald Jamieson, Canadian
Secretary of State for External Affairs). The first policy option, "[p]rohibition of
Canadian firms from adhering to boycotts imposed by foreign countries against
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The Canadian Government's position was formally effectuated
in January 1977 when the Department of Industry, Trade, and
Commerce issued official implementing instructions to its regional
offices and foreign missions.

7

These offices and missions were di-

rected to "withhold all Departmental support and services in connection with any specific transaction where it is found that, in
connection with that transaction, a Canadian company, agency, or
individual has made undertakings in contravention of this pol'2 0
icy.

The Canadian Government's policy simply was to deny

export assistance to those firms complying with certain discriminatory or restrictive trade practices of a foreign transnational
1
28

boycott.

The Canadian Government's official policy regarding international economic boycotts has recently been further refined and
clarified. The Government has deemed "unacceptable" any boycott-related activity that would require a Canadian firm or individual to:
(a) engage in discrimination based on the race, national or ethnic
origin, or religion of any Canadian firm or individual;
(b) refuse to purchase from or sell to any other Canadian firm or
individual;
(c) refuse to sell Canadian goods to any country;
(d) refrain from purchases from any country; or
(e) restrict28commercial
investment or other economic activity in
2
any country.

Primary boycotts are viewed as legally "acceptable" under current Canadian policy.28 3 "Secondary boycott undertakings,

' 28 4

are

third countries," failed to become Canada's policy. Id.
279. Memorandum by G.F. Osbaldeston, Deputy Minister, Dept. of Industry,
Trade and Commerce, InternationalEconomic Boycotts (Jan. 21, 1977).
280. Id.
281. See generally Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, International Economic Boycotts: First Semiannual Report (Oct. 21, 1976-July 31,

1977).
282. Canadian Government Policy on International Economic Boycotts
(1978), at 1 (mimeograph) [hereinafter cited as Canadian Government Policy].
283. Id. at 2; Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, International
Economic Boycotts: Third Semiannual Report (Feb. 1, 1978 to July 31, 1978), at

3 [hereinafter cited as International Economic Boycotts].
284. "Secondary boycott undertakings" refer to those boycott clauses that
"in general terms may require a Canadian company, as a pre-condition for doing
business in boycotting countries, to limit its commercial activities with respect
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deemed "to be at variance 285 with, and "unacceptable"2 86 to, official policy guidelines, because those activities "could involve a relationship separate and distinct from the transaction in question,
and would require the Canadian company to restrict its commercial freedom.

'28 7

"Tertiary boycott undertakings

' 28 8

similarly

have been declared at variance with, and unacceptable to, official
policy guidelines because "Canadian firms could. .. be limited in
their ability to do business with other Canadian companies. '2 89 In
addition, negative certificates of origin have been declared "unacceptable" in Canadian commercial transactions after October 1,
1978,290 and questionnaires requiring information from firms
about another person's race, religion, sex or national origin for use
in boycott enforcement are considered "to be at variance with the
Canadian Government policy."' 29 No Canadian federal statutes or
regulations specifically prohibiting compliance with international
boycotts have been enacted to elaborate upon these guideline provisions, nor does it appear likely that any will be promulgated in
the foreseeable future.
The province of Ontario, however, has enacted antiboycott legislation. On November 9, 1978, the Ontario legislature adopted
The Discriminatory Business Practices Act.292 This law applies
only to activities of natural and juridical Ontario persons, 29 3 and

is in the form of human rights legislation, presumably to preclude
possible preemption by federal jurisdiction.
The Discriminatory Business Practices Act prohibits an Ontario person from refusing to "engage in business" with an individual if that decision is based on the other person's "race, creed,
colour, nationality, ancestry, place of origin, sex or geographical
to another country." Canadian Government Policy, supra note 282, at 2.
285. Id. (emphasis in original).
286. International Economic Boycotts, supra note 283, at 3.
287. Id. at 3; Canadian Government Policy, supra note 282, at 2.
288. "Tertiary boycott undertakings" refer to those boycott clauses that "in
general terms may require an exporter to certify that goods or services are not
procured in whole or part from companies with which a boycotting country refuses to do business." International Economic Boycotts, supra note 283, at 4;
Canadian Government Policy, supra note 282, at 2.
289. See Canadian Government Policy, supra note 282, at 2.
290. Id.
291. Id. (emphasis in original).
292. Discriminatory Business Practices Act, ONT.REV. STAT. ch. 60 (1978).
293. Id. § 5(1).
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location. ' ' 29 4 The Act also forbids refusals to engage in any busi-

ness relationship with another corporate firm or government
predicated upon the aforementioned attributes of that firm's or
government's employees, shareholders, management, or directors. 5
The Ontario law further prohibits a person from dismissing or
refusing to employ, appoint, or promote another person on
grounds of the latter's "race, creed, colour, nationality, ancestry,
place of origin, sex or geographical location."2 96 The Act also
makes it unlawful for an Ontario person to solicit or provide "designated information" about these attributes for purposes of engaging in discriminatory business practices. 29 7 The law expressly

forbids both the solicitation and provision of this type of information when it relates to someone's membership in, or contribution
to, "charitable, fraternal or service organization[s], '29 8 particularly if that information is requested as a precondition for conducting business with a second firm or foreign government. 99
In addition, the law prohibits oral or written statements declaring that "any goods or services supplied or rendered by any person or government do not originate in whole or in part in a specific location, territory, or country for the purpose of engaging in
or assisting in engaging in a discriminatory business practice." 300
Persons who receive boycott-related requests must report them to
a special ministry in the Ontario Government within thirty
days.301 In addition, firms found to be in contravention of the Act
are disqualified from bidding on any Crown contracts for five
years, 0 2 and persons convicted of offenses 3are
liable for punitive
04
3 03
as well as fines.
and exemplary damages,

Both the Canadian Government and the Ontario Legislature
have recognized that foreign transnational boycotts are legitimate
Id. § 4.
Id. § 4(3).
Id. § 4(1), (2).
Id. § 5(2).
Id. § 5(5).
See id. § 5(6).
Id. § 5(4).
Id. § 5(8).
Id. § 10.
Id. § 9(1).
304. Id. § 16. The maximum fine for individuals convicted of an offense is
$5,000 (Canadian); the maximum liability for corporations is $50,000. Id.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.
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exercises of national sovereignty when conducted at the primary
level.30 5 Nonetheless, when such boycotts transcend the government-to-government plane and employ discrimination based upon
race as an enforcement tool, their legitimacy is seriously impugned. The Canadian attitude reiterates an important
point-that the ends sought by economically coercive transnational boycotts may be less controversial legally than the means
used to achieve them.
E. The Netherlands
The Netherlands was the most recent state to adopt formal legislation relevant to transnational boycott activities. As with other
national antiboycott laws enacted after 1975, the Dutch regulation reflected a cautious expression of concern over disciminatory
trade conditions that typify Dutch commercial activities in Middle East markets. Transnational boycotts evoked little public concern in the Netherlands until February 1978, when the Center for
Information and Documentation Israel published a study entitled,
3 0 6 The
Blackbook: The Arab Boycott and the Netherlands.
Blackbook not only suggested that the Dutch business community
had been actively engaged in complying with Arab League boycott demands, 0 7 but more disturbing, that the Dutch Govern-

305.

International Economic Boycotts, supra note 283, at 4. As noted during

the House of Commons debates:
The Government recognizes that Arab countries consider their boycott of
Israel to be a legitimate economic weapon in view of the continuing state
of war between Arab countries and Israel. Canada, however, seeks to improve its relations and to develop trade in peaceful goods with all nations.

Any discrimination against Canadian firms or individuals is contrary to
Canadian concepts of fairness and the Government is determined to ensure that any such discriminatory aspects are not in any way supported by
Government programmes.
Commons Debates, supra note 278, at 302.
306. R. NAFTANIEL, BLACKBOOK: THE ARAB BoYcoTT AND THE NETHERLANDS
(1978).
307. According to Naftaniel's analysis, the following five methods of boycott
compliance occurred frequently:
1. Placing or threatening to place firms on the blacklist that do not comply with Arab League boycott demands. In addition, most Arab contracts
carry a clause that exported products should not be manufactured with
the aid of other firms which are on the blacklist.
2. The anti-Israelclause which compels the exporter to declare he will
respect and abide by the Arab boycott rules-which usually means the
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ment had rarely acted to suppress or even deter such discriminatory activities.308 The Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament
reacted to the latter charge in April 1978. Chaired by Mr. Harry
Vander Bergh, a select twenty-two member committee conducted
closed-door hearings concerning the Arab boycott throughout the
remainder of 1978 and released its report in February 1979.309
The Vander Bergh report generally substantiated the Blackbook's
allegations of discriminatory boycott compliance by Dutch corporations.310 The report did not, however, offer conclusive recom-

firm may not have any form of business cooperation with Israeli firms. If
the exporters' declaration proves to be faulty, the Arab partner to the contract need not pay.
3. The negative certificate of origin indicating that no raw materials or
components of Israeli origin have been used in the goods delivered. These
certificates must be legalized by Dutch Chambers of Commerce.
4. Non-Jew declarations which require firms to provide official statements that personnel sent to Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf States, Libya,
and North Yemen are non-Jewish. Firms also sometimes receive questionnaires asking if the firm is owned or managed by Jews and/or has Jewish
personnel in leading functions.
5. Letters of Credit from banks in Arab countries demand a negative
certificate of origin (and sometimes an anti-Israel clause) to be handed
over with the bill of lading before the letter of credit is paid out. Thus
banks outside the Arab world are reluctant to pay out letters of credit
without required documents.
Id., quoted in Phillips, supra note 49, at 65-66 (emphasis in original).
308. In this connection, Naftaniel's study concluded that Dutch Chambers of
Commerce and the Dutch Foreign Ministry had approved more than 7,000 negative certificates of origin annually. Phillips, supra note 49, at 25.
309. Id. at 66.
310. The Select Committee's report concluded that: (1) Dutch companies
were confronted with boycott demands in virtually all phases of their business
transactions with Arab League states; (2) many Dutch companies were forced to
sign negative certificates of origin (to show the company had no business ties in
Israel) in order to be eligible for Arab business; (3) negative certificates of origin
were approved on a large scale by the Chambers of Commerce and by the Foreign Ministry, which verified the authenticity of the signatures under the statements; (4) some Dutch companies had collected and issued collective or individual declarations that employees sent to Arab countries were not Jewish; (5)
particular sectors of Dutch trade and industry had discontinued or refused to
embark on business relationships with Israel because of the risks involved; (6)
while the Committee believed the Arab economic boycott started from the principle of nonracial discrimination, it was clear that the boycott obviously discriminated between Jews and non-Jews, and that people had been blacklisted simply
because they were Jewish; and (7) both the Dutch Government and private sector institutions seemed to cooperate to a greater degree with Arab boycott de-
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mendations as to how the Government should counter these discriminatory practices.311 Following protracted debate and
controversy in the Parliament, article 419 quater 312 emerged as

the compromise regulatory statute.
Article 429 quater of the Dutch Criminal Code went into effect
on June 29, 1981.313 The fundamental aim of article 429 quater is
to secure "an overall picture of the size and scope of the effects of
foreign boycott embargoes in the Netherlands.

' 31 4

Article 429

provides that Dutch business firms who receive requests to comply with foreign sanctions must notify the Minister of Economic
Affairs.3 1 5 Penalties in the law relate only to a firm's failure to

comply with this notification obligation. Unlike United States legislation, article 429 quater does not prescribe penalties for compliance or noncompliance with the foreign sanctions themselves.316 In the personal opinion of one Dutch diplomat:
This approach is in keeping with the view of the government of
the Netherlands that compliance by individual persons or companies with embargoes or boycotts imposed against states as part of a
military or political conflict should continue to be permissible provided, of course, that such 3compliance
did not conflict with the rule
17
of law in the Netherlands.

The political and legal presumptions upon which the regulatory
substance of article 429 rests has been summarized as follows:
mands than did their counterparts in other Western countries. Id. at 24-25.

311. Id. at 25.
312. According to a spokesman in the Dutch embassy, "quater" may be
roughly translated as "section."
313. Wetboek van Strafrecht art. 429 (1981) (Neth.). The article provides
that:
He, who, in the practice of a profession or trade, makes a distinction between persons because of race will be punished with imprisonment for a
maximum of one month or with a fine of a maximum of Hfl. 10,000. This
provision is not applicable to transactions to which persons belonging to a
particular ethnic or cultural minority group confer a privileged position in
order to abolish a factual inequality.
Letter from Daniel Magraw to the author (Jan. 24, 1983).
314. Letter from Ch.R. van Beuge, Economics Minister, Netherlands Embassy, Washington, D.C. to the author (Feb. 15, 1983), at 1 [hereinafter cited as
van Beuge letter].
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 2.
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The government of the Netherlands has always taken the view
that there is no general obligation under international law to maintain trade relations with another country. The refusal of certain
countries to do business directly or indirectly with another country
or countries does not in itself constitute a violation of an obligation
under international law. Although the government of the Netherlands does not therefore object from the point of view of international law to economic sanctions in international relations and does
not regard them as unacceptable as instruments of international
relations in themselves, it is concerned about the possible secondary consequences of such measures for the Netherlands. In this
connection [the Netherlands] considered that it would be useful to
obtain more precise information as to the nature and scope of the
secondary consequences of foreign embargoes and boycotts for the
Netherlands.31 8
As antiboycott legislation, article 429 quater is not directed at
any specific foreign transnational boycott imposed as a facet of
some political or military conflict, 19 but instead, is concerned
"with the phenomenon as a whole" and intends to obtain through
compulsory notification, greater information regarding the "possi32 0
ble side effects" of foreign sanctions upon the Netherlands.
When compared with previous commercial discrimination provisions in the Dutch criminal code, article 429 quater has at least
three notable improvements. First, the conceptual range of "nondiscrimination" is no longer limited to a few business endeavors;
it now spans the entire spectrum of economic activities. 3 21 Second, article 429 quater "has improved on the old in so far as the
discriminated person [previously] had to prove that he had been
disadvantaged, which was difficult, whilst it is now sufficient to
prove that there has been a difference in treatment. 322 Third, the
reprehensibility of integrating racial discrimination into commerce was deemed sufficiently odious by the Dutch Parliament to
warrant multiplying the old criminal penalty ten times in the new
law. 23 Although information regarding violations of and prosecu-

318. Id. at 1. Eerste Kamer, 20 mei 1981, at 1025 (statement of De heer

Derks).
319. van Beuge letter, supra note 313, at 2.

320. Id.
321. Id.; Eerste Kamer, supra note 317, at 1025.

322. van Beuge letter, supra note 313, at 2.
323. Id.; Eerste Kamer, supra note 317, at 1029-30 (statement of Minister de

Ruiter).
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tions under article 429 quater is as yet unavailable, the Dutch
Government clearly intended the tenfold increase in the fine to be
a conspicuous signal of official concern.
The legislative history of the Dutch antiboycott provision suggests that the Dutch Government has been ambivalent about
transnational boycotts in general. While the Government evinces
sensitivity to the political nuances of racial, ethnic, and religious
discrimination, Dutch officials are openly reluctant to become involved with any transnational boycott that lacks international
recognition or sanction.3 2 4 Consequently, the Dutch Government
refuses to grant legal recognition to, or maintain official diplomatic relations with, any foreign boycott office.3 1 5 The Government is also noticeably hesitant to intervene legally either for or
against Dutch firms that encounter business problems stemming
from a foreign boycott's operation.3 26 In assuming this laissezfaire attitude, the Dutch Government ostensibly intends to eschew any official role regarding transnational boycotts and private-sector activities; whether by prosecuting corporations for
participating in the restrictive trade practices of a boycott, or in
sanctioning the legality of a corporation's complicity as participants in a boycott.
F. Great Britain
Great Britain has not adopted antiboycott legislation, nor is it
likely to do so in the near future. British public interest in, and
government attention to, transnational boycotts, however, has not
been indifferent.
Prompted by growing public agitation over discriminatory aspects of the Arab boycott against Israel,3 27 a parliamentary com324. Phillips, supra note 49, at 27.
325. In February 1979, a spokesman for the Dutch Foreign Ministry stated:

The Government does not wish to be involved in a boycott which is not

internationally sanctioned. We do not recognize the Arab Boycott Office,

and we have never had official contacts with it. The Ministry never inter-

venes on a firm's behalf in cases of boycott problems. The Government
feels it is up to individual companies to decide on compliance. We have no
role, and will take none until we see the results of the Parliamentary

debates.
at 69.
326. Id. at 27.

Id.,

327. The Arab boycott first aroused British public interest in 1963, when
Lord Mancroft, a British Jew and former Cabinet memnber, resigned from the
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mittee was created in May 1977 for the express purpose of drafting antiboycott legislation.3 28 The product of the committee's
deliberations was the Foreign Boycotts Bill of 1977,29 modeled
closely after the United States Export Amendments of 1977.330
Introduced by Lord Byers to the House of Lords on July 12, 1977,
the bill died when that session of Parliament adjourned. The bill
was reinstated by Lord Byers on November 22, 1977, and was
given a second reading on January 30, 1978.
The Byers boycott bill defined a foreign boycott as "any policy
adopted by or action taken by a foreign government or agency
thereof to discriminate against any other nation or citizen of
other nation or a religious, ethnic or political group in the course
of trade or business."331 The prohibitions contained in the bill
were relatively extensive in scope, and covered refusals to do buscorporate board of Norwich Union Insurance Company in reaction to Arab pressure for his dismissal. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1963, at 13, col. 1; id., Dec. 4,
1963, at 13, col. 1; id., Dec. 6, 1963, at 7, col. 3; id., Dec. 14, 1963, at 7, col. 1.
328. The Committee membership included Arthur Bottomley of the Labour
Party; Conservative MP Hugh Frazer; Lord Byer, Liberal Leader of the House
of Lords; and the Duke of Devonshire.
329. An Act to Prevent Foreign Boycotts; and for Connected Purposes (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Foreign Boycott Bill].
330. See supra note 228. The Foreign Boycott Bill of 1977 specifically prohibited any British person:
(1) by themselves, or through persons controlled by them, from discriminating against or refusing to do business with any other person in furtherance of a foreign boycott request or condition [made or imposed directly
or indirectly to implement or further a foreign boycott];
(2) from altering their normal course of business for the purpose of furthering a foreign boycott or complying with a boycott request or condition;
(3) from adopting or continuing any course of business or practice to
further a foreign boycott or comply with a boycott request or condition
and which course of business would not be adopted or continued save for
the boycott condition;
(4) from seeking or providing any information concerning another person's religion, racial or national origin, business connections or memberships if that information is sought or provided to further a foreign boycott
or in consequence of a foreign boycott request or condition;
(5) from providing or demanding a certificate of origin of goods which
excludes a specific country, or;
(6) from paying, confirming or processing a letter of credit or shipping
documents which contain a condition or requirement whose fulfillment or
performance is an offense under the Act.
Id. § 2; cf. supra notes 225-39 and accompanying text.
331. Foreign Boycott Bill, supra note 328, § 1(a).
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mess, complicity in furthering discriminatory boycotts, provision
of information for boycott requests, the supplying of certificates
of origin, and the processing of letters of credit.332 Reporting requirements for British firms were also provided, 333 as were strict
334
penalties for convictions arising from boycott-related offenses.
As a private bill lacking official government support, the Foreign Boycotts Bill of 1977 had little prospect of passage. The
Bill's probability of failure intensified during its second reading
in January 1978, when the British Government confirmed its opposition to any antiboycott legislation that deprived corporate
firms of the right to make their own decisions regarding foreign
commercial opportunities.3 3 5 Lord Byers' bill was referred to a
House of Lords Select Committee for perusal, study, and assessment, and six months later, on July 28, 1978, the Select Committee released its findings in a two volume report.33 6 The Commit-

tee's report to the British Government contained eleven policy
recommendations for dealing with transnational boycotts in gen-

eral and the Arab boycott in particular: (1) British policy toward
the Arab boycott of Israel should (a) not impede a Middle East

332. See id.
333. Any British firm receiving a boycott-related request had to report it to
the Secretary of State within 28 days. Id. § 3(1).
334. Failure to provide reports to the Secretary of State carried a maximum
fine of £ 5,000. Id. § 3(3). A conviction for a substantive offense under the Act
would have subjected an individual or corporate executive to a maximum fine of
£ 5,000. Subsequent offenses could have resulted in fines of £ 10,000, two years
in prison, or both. Id. § 7(1). Corporations convicted would have been liable for
fines ranging up to £ 100,000. Id. § 7(2).
335. Baroness Stedman stated the British Government's official position:
The justification for this legislation is said to be the protection of individuals, companies, and businesses from the direct and indirect consequences and pressures of the foreign boycott. There is, however, no way in
which passage of legislation will prevent these pressures and consequences
from causing inquiries. Requests for information will still be sent to companies. If they cannot respond to inquiries, the result may simply be that
they are prevented from arguing their case or even from representing the
true facts in a case involving mistaken or misleading information.
Statement of Baroness Stedman, House of Lords (Jan. 30, 1978) reprinted in
Turck, supra note 214, at 724; see also Response of Michael Meacher, Parliamentary Undersecretary of Trade, to Hugh Frazer, MP (Stafford and Stone)
and Anthony Steen, MP (Liverpool, Wavertree), House of Commons, Parliamentary Question 1213 (July 13, 1977).
336. Select Committee on the Foreign Boycotts Bill, House of Lords Paper
1977/8 No. 265 (2 Vols.) (1978).
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settlement; (b) maintain friendly relations with Arab states and
Israel; (c) promote exports of the United Kingdom; and (d) preserve the principle of nondiscrimination within the United Kingdom among peoples of different races, religions, and ethnic origins. (2) Because the Foreign Boycotts Bill failed to meet the first
three conditions above, "its passage involved risks which nearly
all those involved were unwilling to take." Accordingly, the Select
Committee recommended that the Boycotts Bill should not proceed. (3) Given that the "situation is not satisfactory," British
companies should be free to decide their own policy attitudes towards boycotts in light of their commercial interests; however, the
Government and Parliament should set the political context
within which companies may make those decisions. (4) Companies should be encouraged to trade in Middle East markets despite the boycott, with the Government providing active assistance toward that end. (5) More diplomatic opportunities should
be taken, especially informally, to reduce the incidence of secondary and tertiary boycotts. (6) "Whenever possible," British companies should avoid signing contracts containing conditions that
specifically discriminate against a friendly state. (7) The British
Government should carefully evaluate the use of public funds in
support of particular boycott-related transactions and whether
boycott-related documents should be recognized at all. (8) No ban
should be imposed on guarantees by the Export Credits Guarantee Department (i.e. the British Government's export credit insurance company) for boycott-related transactions or advertisements that publicize boycott conditions. (9) The British
Government should cease authenticating negative certificates of
origin. (10) Compliance with a discriminatory boycott within the
United Kingdom should come within the legal scope of the Race
Relations Act. (11) The British Government should take the initiative in the Council of the European Economic Community to develop a common European policy regarding boycotts, the ultimate
the Community's fundamental
goal of which would be to foster
337
principle of nondiscrimination.

Since the Select Committee's findings were made public in
1979, the British Government has remained overtly reluctant to
support any antiboycott legislation in Parliament. 338 This unwill337. Id. at 40-41.
338. In a recent debate in the House of Commons, Dr. M.S. Miller attributed
the current "lily-livered" policy of the British Government toward the anti-Is-
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ingness presumably stems from several factors. First, antiboycott
legislation would undoubtedly have a negative effect on British
trade with Arab states and would likely exacerbate Britain's already weak balance of payments situation.3 9 Second, not only
would antiboycott enforcement be very difficult and complicated
to maintain, it would also necessitate the creation of an unwanted
new bureaucratic administrative structure within the Govern-

raeli boycott to Arab oil power, Arab petrodollar investments, and military-strategic considerations:
These factors have contributed to the British singular, and even exceptional, weakness in the face of the boycott. In no other European country
is there a more widespread secondary boycott-the Arab blacklisting of
British firms which continue trading with Israel and which receive no protection from Whitehall. However, there is also a tertiary boycott-a boycott of British firms which trade with other British firms already blacklisted. This is a very intricate ball game. In no other European country is
there a more widespread voluntary boycott, entailing spontaneous application to the Arab boycott offices for forms to fill in and negative certificates
of origin to be completed. There is a veritable deluge of these, because the
British Government does nothing to discourage the practice.
36 PARL. DEm. H.C. (6th ser.) 732 (1983) (statement of Dr. M.S. Miller, M.P.
East Kilbride). Dr. Miller went on to propose policy prescriptions for dealing
with the Arab boycott:
It is not enough for the Government to express disapproval of the boycott. They should officially and actively discourage compliance with it.
Government Departments, offices and institutions should be instructed
not to comply with the boycott. This should also apply to nationalized
industries and companies in which there is a majority public interest.
The Foreign Office should cease authenticating signatures on discriminatory certificates of origin. I do not accept that this would be "an unacceptable risk to our exports." There should be a legal obligation on British
firms to notify the Department of Trade of any boycott requests or demands that they receive and whether these have been complied with. Such
reports of compliance should be open to public inspection. Compliance
with the secondary boycott should be made illegal. This would enable
British business men to give a prompt and effective response to boycott
pressure.
Id. at 733.
339. The Economist wryly commented on this particular Committee recommendation when it observed:
British exporters to rich Arab markets can relax. The possibility of a British law forbidding companies to comply with Arab boycott demands is
sinking into the oil-rich sands of Arabia. A House of Lords select committee studying the Foreign Boycotts Bill this week found £2.7 billion reasons
for burying it.
My Lords, The Boycott Must Go On, ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 1978, at 101.
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ment. Last, and perhaps most telling, no discernably strong consensus exists, either in Parliament or among the British public
generally, for the enactment of such an antiboycott law.
The British Government has reacted to the Select Committee's
report and recommendations with modest enthusiasm. Indeed,
there is an admitted official aversion to any governmental intervention into free trade arrangements abroad-a repugnance generally shared by Great Britain's business and banking communities. There is little likelihood that British policy will change
sufficiently to produce national antiboycott legislation. Without
government support, there is little chance that an antiboycott bill
will be passed in Great Britain in the foreseeable future. The lesson to be gleaned from the British antiboycott legislative experience is clear. Absent a perceived domestic need, political will, and
requisite constituency pressure, national antiboycott bills are unlikely to be regarded as political priorities. Municipal proposals
will, therefore, have little chance for eventual enactment into law.
G.

Concluding Observations

Despite the discriminatory trade practices engendered by transnational boycotts, municipal regulations enacted to dissuade compliance with boycotts tend to be the exception rather than the
rule. More specifically, few nations have enacted legislation
against corporate compliance with the secondary and tertiary facets of the ongoing Arab boycott. Only the United States has
passed comprehensive antiboycott legislation that is actively enforced. Since 1977 France, Canada, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Norway, 34 0 Sweden, 3 "1 Denmark,' 4 2 and West Germany 43
340. See Turck, supra note 214, at 713-38.
341. Sweden has no specific antiboycott laws. A private bill, The Protection
of Swedish Trade with Israel Act, was introduced by Gabriel Romanus in the
Risksdag on January 21, 1976. It was subsequently rejected. Id. at 733-35.
342. Although Denmark has no national antiboycott legislation, it has reportedly refused to authenticate negative certificates of origin in boycott-related
activities. Id. at 736 & n. 108 (citing J. BAHTI, THE ARAB BoYcoTT OF IsRAEL 61

(1967)).
343. West Germany has no specific antiboycott laws and reportedly does not
intend to introduce any. According to embassy officials, West German companies must decide on their own how to react to boycott pressures and requirement demands. W. NELSON & T. PRrriIE, THE

ECONOMIC

WAR AGAINST THE

JEWS

138 (1977); Discussion with Mr. Werner Hein, Embassy of Federal Republic of
Germany, in Washington, D.C., (Feb. 10, 1983).
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have officially voiced concern over transnational boycotts. These
governments have not deemed legislative responses necessary, appropriate, or sufficiently cost-effective to counter the discriminatory commercial ramifications of a transnational boycott.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Writing in 1934, C.L. Bouv6 observed that, "the place of the
national boycott in international relations has to a limited extent
only engaged the attention of international jurists. This may be
due in part to the fact that one member only of the family of
nations has, so to speak, specialized in the use of this instrumentality."' 3 44 Professor Bouv6 was, of course, referring to China's
proclivity to resort to national boycotts as measures of public protests against the policies of foreign governments.- 5 In recent
years, however, use of the transnational boycott as a measure of
international coercion has become a topic of considerably more
concern, largely due to the pervasive, commercially coercive actions taken against Israel by Arab League member states.
The primary transnational boycott is generally regarded as a
legitimate instrument of international economic coercion. This
undoubtedly is true if a boycott is employed either as a measure
of self-defense or as an act of retorsion. When placed within the
context of United Nations Charter law, a transnational boycott
does not qualify either as a "threat or use of force," or as "aggression." Furthermore, primary transnational boycotts usually do
not violate the accepted norm of nonintervention. In the absence
of relevant treaty arrangements, the conduct and cultivation of
international trade relationships remains a legal function of state
choice, not an implicit or universal obligation.
On the other hand, the legality of transnational boycotts having
secondary and tertiary levels is jeopardized by their very character. By promoting commercial policies expressly designed to affect
the national economic domain of noninvolved third-party states,
multitiered transnational boycotts are clearly considered to be a
means of illicit, albeit indirect, economic intervention, despite the
paucity of pertinent municipal legislation. This is especially true
when these boycotts resort to enforcement techniques that foster
religious, ethnic, racial, or creedal discrimination in third-party

344.
345.

Bouv6, supra note 4, at 22.
See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
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states. Thus, under international law, the secondary and tertiary
aspects of transnational boycotts should be viewed as illegal appendages to a generally legal means of international economic
coercion.
History indicates that the functional utility of transnational
boycotts has been temporally sporadic, politically opportunistic,
and economically inconclusive. The recognized status of transnational boycotts in international law has evolved piecemeal
through customary state practice, emergent general principles of
law, and writings of legal commentators. The increasingly interdependent global economic order underscores the paramount role
international law must assume in maintaining regularized patterns of transnational commercial intercourse. Given these considerations, the international legal community should continue to
treat transnational boycotts as an appropriate legal issue that
merits serious attention.

